Trade and economic development in global value chains:
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The	 thesis	explores	how	the	 fragmentation	of	production	and	 the	 subsequent	emergence	of	




that	 allows	 to	 identify	 countries’	 domestic	 contribution	 to	 trade	 specialisation	 and	 export	
performance.	I	explore	these	issues	implementing	the	generalised	method	of	moments	(GMM)	
to	estimate	an	autoregressive	model.	In	doing	this,	we	contribute	to	the	literature	on	trade	in	
value	 added,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 structural	 change	 and	 the	 role	 of	 manufacturing	 for	 economic	
growth.		
We	 find	 that	 natural	 resources	 are	 not,	 unsurprisingly,	 a	 beneficial	 specialisation	 pattern.	
Specialisation	in	manufacturing	has	a	different	effect	depending	on	the	technology	level;	low-
tech	 manufacturing	 seems	 to	 exert	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 countries	 trade	 performance.	 In	





paper,	 with	 natural	 resources	 as	 a	 detrimental	 specialisation	 pattern,	 we	 assess	 whether	
backward	linkages	emanating	from	this	sector	can	spur	export	 in	other	sectors,	namely	high-
tech	manufacturing	and	KIBS.	We	use	the	same	data	as	the	first	Chapter	and	also	implement	a	
system	GMM,	 finding	 that	a	 large	 intermediate	domestic	demand	 from	the	natural	 resource	
sector	has	a	positive	effect	on	the	export	of	domestic	value	added	of	both	KIBS	and	high-tech	
manufacturing.	These	results	are	strong	and	significant	both	for	the	mining	and	the	agriculture	
sectors.	 One	 of	 the	 main	 policy	 implications	 of	 these	 results	 is	 that	 countries	 with	 a	 large	








are	 related	 to	 the	 complexity	 of	 each	 relationship	 and	 the	 capabilities	 of	 the	 Colombian	
exporters.	 In	 line	with	 the	 growing	 literature	 on	 trade	 and	 firm	 heterogeneity,	we	 find	 that	





support	 to	 the	well-established	 literature	 on	 GVCs,	 confirming	 that	 power	 relationships	 are	
related	to	exporters’	performance,	especially	in	terms	of	sophistication.	We	contribute	to	this	






One	 of	 the	 most	 salient	 consequences	 of	 globalisation	 is	 the	 fragmentation	 of	
production	across	countries	and	the	emergence	of	global	value	chains	(GVCs):	this	has	
led	 to	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 countries’	 exports	 consisting	 of	 imported	 inputs	 (OECD	
2013a;	Baldwin	2012).		
It	has	been	argued	that	a	key	factor	in	shaping	countries’	economic	performance	is	not	
whether	 GVC	 integration	 is	 beneficial	 (or	 not)	 per	 se,	 but	 rather	 the	 way	 in	 which	
countries	 (and	 firms)	 enter	 GVCs	 (Kaplinsky	 2004;	 Mcmillan	 et	 al.	 2014;	 Baldwin	 &	
Lopez-Gonzalez	2015).		
On	the	one	hand,	at	the	macro	level	the	mode	of	insertion	in	GVCs	will	depend	on	the	
relationship	 between	 domestic	 production	 and	 export	 dynamics,	 which	 has	 become	
less	 straightforward:	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 two	 has	 in	 fact	 widened	 as	 countries’	
exports	 are	 increasingly	 the	 outcome	 of	 production	 activities	 happening	 in	 other	
countries	(Baldwin	2011).	
Therefore,	 it	 becomes	 necessary	 to	 reappraise	 this	 relationship	 and	 to	 establish	
whether	differences	in	countries’	productive	structure	are	a	determinant	of	countries’	
overall	 performance	 in	 GVCs	 and	 the	 sectors	 in	 which	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
participate.		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 at	 the	 micro	 level	 there	 is	 now	 a	 large	 body	 of	 evidence	
emphasising	 the	 importance	of	power	 relationships	within	GVCs,	 leading	 to	different	
kinds	 of	 governance	 and	 economic	 outcomes	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Humphrey	 and	
Schmitz	2002).	However,	the	scholarship	has	not	so	far	put	forward	a	measurable	and	
comparable	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 power	 and	 its	 relationship	 with	 firms’	
ability	to	improve	their	position	in	GVCs.		
So	it	seems	that	countries’	domestic	features,	their	productive	structure	in	particular,	




Value	 chains	 represent	 all	 the	 activities	 involved	 to	 bring	 a	 product	 or	 service	 from	
conception,	 through	production	 to	delivery	 to	 final	 consumers	 (Kaplinsky	and	Morris	
2000).	Since	 the	 late	1980s,	 trade	 liberalisation	and	 the	 ICT	 revolution	have	 reduced	
not	only	the	costs	of	transport	and	communication,	but	have	also	made	coordination	
of	the	different	productive	activities	much	easier	and	cheaper	(Baldwin	2012).	This	has	
led	 to	 the	 increasing	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 across	 countries,	 making	 value	
chains	global	(Gereffi	1994).		
Now	that	production	 is	 fragmented	across	countries,	 it	has	been	argued	that	 it	 is	no	
longer	 necessary	 to	 develop	 the	 full	 set	 of	 capabilities	 and	 technology	 necessary	 to	




This	has	sparked	some	optimism	with	 respect	 to	 the	potential	 for	new	specialisation	





Structural	 change,	 i.e.	 long-term	 shifts	 in	 the	 composition	 of	 countries’	 economic	









The	 international	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 has	 changed	 this.	 By	 joining	 GVCs,	
countries	 can	 now	 develop	 an	 export	 specialisation	 in	 a	 given	 sector,	 without	
experiencing	changes	of	 the	 same	magnitude	 in	 their	domestic	productive	 structure.	
This	is	because	much	of	what	countries	export	can	be	the	outcome	of	imported	inputs	
produced	abroad.		
In	 line	with	 this,	 and	despite	many	 countries	 joining	GVCs	over	 the	past	decade,	we	
observe	very	diverse	outcomes	in	developing	countries.	This	suggests	that	the	manner	
in	 which	 such	 GVC	 integration	 takes	 place	 is	 crucial	 for	 countries’	 development	
(Kaplinsky	2004;	McMillan	et	al.	2014).	
The	 relationship	 between	 GVC	 participation,	 structural	 change	 and,	 ultimately,	
economic	 development	 is	 in	 fact	 not	 straightforward.	 It	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 related	 to	
different	aspects,	both	at	the	macro-,	meso-	and	micro-level.		
In	this	thesis	we	explore	in	particular	the	three	following	issues:	
● First,	at	 the	macro-level,	do	different	export	 specialisation	 trajectories	 impact	
countries’	 trade	performance,	 in	a	GVC	context?	To	answer	 this	question,	we	
revisit	 the	 link	 between	 countries’	 domestic	 productive	 structure,	 trade	
specialisation	 and	 performance	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 international	
fragmentation	of	production.	We	 find	 that	 increasing	 specialisation	 in	natural	
resources	 and	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 countries’	
export	 performance,	 which	 we	 discuss	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 on-going	 debate	
around	structural	change	and	industrialisation.		
● Second,	 as	 we	 find	 that	 specialisation	 in	 certain	 sectors,	 such	 as	 natural	
resources,	can	be	detrimental	to	countries’	economic	performance,	we	explore	
another	aspect	of	the	relationship	between	domestic	production	structure	and	
GVC	 participation.	 Focusing	 on	 countries	 with	 a	 specialisation	 in	 natural	
resources,	 we	 look	 at	 inter-sectoral	 backward	 linkages	 as	 a	 platform	 for	 the	
emergence	 of	 exports	 in	 new	 sectors.	 Specifically	 we	 test	 the	 following	 new	
conjecture:	 can	 the	 intermediated	 domestic	 demand	 of	 natural	 resource	
industries	 spur	 exports	 from	 both	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 and	 knowledge	
intensive	business	services?	
● Third,	 GVCs	 take	 place	 at	 the	 micro-level	 in	 the	 form	 of	 buyer-supplier	
relationships	 in	 which	 power	 asymmetries	may	 influence	 the	 possibilities	 for	
firms	 to	 introduce	 new,	more	 sophisticated	 products.	 So,	 is	 power	 in	 buyer-
supplier	relationships	associated	with	export	sophistication	and	upgrading?	We	







but	 they	 have	 also	 led	 to	 a	 growing	 gap	 between	 a	 country’s	 exports	 and	 its	 actual	
contribution,	 in	 value	 added	 terms,	 to	 the	 production	 process	 (Baldwin	 2011).	
Crucially,	 opening	 the	 global	 economy	 has	 led	 countries	 to	 different	 productive	
trajectories,	yielding	widely	different	outcomes	(McMillan	et	al.	2014).		
Different	specialisation	patterns	may	have	different	growth	potentials	 (Amable	2000;	
Matsuyama	1992)	due	 to	differences	 in	 income	and	price	elasticities	of	 the	products	
exported	(Thirlwall	1979;	Cimoli	et	al.	2009)	as	well	as	endogenous	structural	change	
(Fagerberg	1988;	Uchida	and	Cook	2005).	
The	 scholarship	 has	 particularly	 emphasised	 the	 positive	 relationship	 between	
manufacturing	 and	 economic	 growth	 (Szirmai	 and	 Verspagen	 2015;	 Szirmai	 2012;	
Matsuyama	2008;	Rodrik	2013).		
There	are,	however,	growing	concerns	around	this	view,	 in	the	current	context.	First,	
developing	 countries	 seem	 to	 be	 specialising	 away	 from	 manufacturing	 towards	
services	 at	 increasingly	 low	 income	 levels	 (Rodrik	 2015).	 Second,	 Szirmai	 and	
Verspagen	(2015)	cast	 further	doubt	on	whether	manufacturing	 is	still	working	as	an	














the	 dynamic,	 rather	 than	 static,	 effects	 of	 changes	 in	 the	 production	 structure	 of	
countries.	de	Vries	et	al.	 (2017)	 recently	emphasised	how	developing	countries	have	
managed	 to	 move	 away	 from	 an	 agriculture-based	 economic	 structure	 towards	
services,	which	 led	 to	 a	 one-off	 static	 gain	 but	 failed	 to	 trigger	 a	 long-term	positive	
productivity	dynamic.		
A	 value	added	approach	 is	particularly	 relevant	 to	understanding	 the	 implications	of	
structural	change	in	light	of	the	emergence	of	GVCs.		
First,	the	gross	exports	(or	output)	of	a	country	may	consist	of	value	added	imported	
from	 other	 countries;	 this	 makes	 it	 harder	 to	 clearly	 appraise	 countries’	 domestic	
productive	structure.		
Second,	 value	 added	 produced	 by	 a	 given	 sector	may	 be	 exported	 indirectly	 in	 the	
gross	export	of	another	sector,	which	again	would	give	biased	perception	of	countries’	
domestic	productive	structure.	This	is	likely	to	be	particularly	true	for	business	services	
that	 are	 often	 important	 in	 increasing	 other	 sectors’	 performance,	 providing	 crucial	
inputs	to	the	production	process	(Guerrieri	and	Meliciani	2005;	Meliciani	and	Savona	
2014).	
So,	 a	 first	 contribution	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 revisit	 the	 link	 between	 economic	
performance	 and	 specialisation,	 contributing	 to	 the	 debate	 on	 premature	
deindustrialisation	and	structural	change	towards	services	in	a	GVC	framework.		
Second,	we	also	 study	dynamic,	 rather	 than	 static	and	one-off,	 effects	of	 changes	 in	
countries’	 specialisation.	 In	 doing	 so,	 we	 also	 propose	 a	 new	 application	 for	 input-
output	measures	to	compute	specialisation	indexes.		
We	wish	 therefore	 to	 study	whether	 the	acceleration	 in	different	 specialisations	has	
different	 impacts	on	countries’	export	growth.	 In	order	 to	bring	 this	 to	 the	data	and	
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Balassa	 indexes	 in	 value	 added;	 these	 reflect,	 we	 argue,	 countries’	 domestic	
productive	structure	more	accurately	than	their	gross	export	homologues.		
We	perform	our	analysis	with	an	autoregressive	dynamic	panel,	using	a	system	GMM	
to	 deal	 with	 potential	 endogeneity	 due	 to	 the	 simultaneous	 effects	 between	 trade	
specialisation	and	export	performance.		
We	 find	 that	 countries	 increasing	 their	 specialisation	 in	 low-tech	manufacturing	 and	
natural	 resources	 experience	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 domestic	 value	 added	 embodied	 in	
their	 exports.	We	detect	 a	positive	effect	of	 increases	 in	 specialisation	 in	both	high-
tech	manufacturing	and	knowledge	 intensive	services,	although	only	during	the	crisis	
period.		
The	 general	 implication	 of	 these	 results	 is	 that	 countries’	 production	 and	 export	
structure	 remain	 a	 determinant	 of	 their	 economic	 performance,	 and	 countries	
specialising	in	GVCs	in	different	sectors	will	fare	differently.		
The	Chapter	provides	a	thorough	discussion	of	these	results	in	relation	to	the	debate	
around	 premature	 deindustrialisation,	 and	 argues	 that	 specialising	 in	 low-tech	
manufacturing	to	then	move	onto	high-tech	activities	may	no	longer	be	a	viable	option	
for	developing	countries.		
Our	 results	 on	 the	 negative	 effect	 of	 an	 acceleration	 of	 the	 specialisation	 in	 natural	
resources	on	countries’	export	performance	are	consistent	with	a	very	large	literature	
regarding	 developing	 countries	 with	 such	 a	 productive	 structure	 being	 bound	 to	
experience	stagnant	or	low	growth.	The	third	chapter	of	this	thesis	contributes	to	this	





A	 common	 way	 of	 referring	 to	 the	 empirical	 association	 between	 natural	 resource	




2008)	 and	 opposing	 it	 (Lederman	 and	 Maloney	 2012;	 Wright	 and	 Czelusta	 2004;	
Brunnschweiler	and	Bulte	2008;	Bloch	and	Owusu	2012).	
One	 of	 the	 crucial	 aspects	 of	 this	 debate	 is	 the	 link	 between	 abundance	 in	 natural	
resources	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 export	 diversification.	 This	 is	 again	 related	 to	 the	
structure	of	the	domestic	economy,	and	specifically	inter-sectoral	linkages	originating	
from	natural	resource	industries.	
The	notion	of	 a	 specialisation	 in	natural	 resources	halting	 the	development	of	other	
sectors	and,	ultimately,	export	diversification	relies	on	two	theoretical	explanations.		
First,	 a	 large	 natural	 resource	 sector	 would	 hinder	 other	 sectors	 through	 an	
appreciation	 in	 the	 exchange	 rate	 reducing	 competitiveness	 of	 other	 tradable	
(manufactured)	products	and	draw	 investments	away	 from	non-NR	 intensive	 sectors	
(Corden	1984;	Harding	and	Venables	2016;	Venables	2016).		
This	view	was	first	put	forward	based	on	the	experience	of	the	Netherlands	after	the	
discovery	 of	 a	 large	 endowment	 in	 natural	 gas	 that	 negatively	 impacted	 exports	 in	
other	sectors,	which	is	why	this	mechanism	is	often	referred	to	as	the	Dutch	disease.		
Second,	 and	more	broadly,	 natural	 resource	 industries	 are	 often	 considered	 enclave	
sectors,	with	 little	 to	no	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	with	 the	 rest	of	 the	economy	 (Heeks	
1998;	 Matsuyama	 1992;	 Vogel	 1994).	 The	 importance	 of	 such	 linkages	 stems	 from	




through	 backward	 and	 forward	 linkages,	 would	 also	 lift	 other	 sectors,	 through	 an	
unbalanced	development	strategy.		
More	 recently,	 and	 relatedly	 with	 this	 literature,	 Hausmann	 and	 Klinger	 (2006)	 and	








diversification	 towards	 downstream	 manufacturing	 activities	 in	 resource	 abundant	
countries.		




The	 third	 chapter	 of	 this	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 this	 debate	 by	 exploring	 a	 different	
strategy,	 i.e.	 whether	 countries	 with	 a	 large	 endowment	 in	 natural	 resources	 could	





from	 a	 way	 of	 exploiting	 their	 specialisation	 to	 foster	 exports	 in	 other	 sectors	 and	
specialise	 away	 from	 natural	 resource	 industries.	 Second,	 countries	 with	 a	
specialisation	 in	 natural	 resources	 are	 also	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 large	 domestic	
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value	 added	 terms:	 this	 is	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 emergent	 GVCs	 and	 the	 issues	
discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 i.e.	 export	 specialisation	 based	 on	 value	 added	
(rather	 than	 gross	 exports)	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 represent	 the	 underlying	 domestic	
structure,	 and	 services	 often	 tend	 to	 be	 exported	 embodied	 in	 other	manufactured	
products.		
We	 find	 that	 backward	 linkages	 from	 the	 natural	 resource	 sector	 can	 indeed	 foster	
exports	in	knowledge	intensive	business	services.	We	also	test	our	main	conjecture	for	
the	export	of	high-tech	manufacturing,	 finding	that	 in	 this	case	the	positive	effect	of	
backward	linkages	from	natural	resource	industries	vanishes	when	we	control	for	the	
productivity	of	this	sector.		
This	 suggests	 that	 relying	 on	 the	 sheer	 strength	 of	 backward	 linkages	 from	 natural	















aggregate	 phenomena;	 these	 are,	 however,	 the	 results	 of	 changes	 and	 firm-to-firm	
interactions	at	the	micro	level.		
There	 is	 a	 well-established	 literature	 on	 GVCs	 exploring	 such	 interactions,	 mainly	
through	case	studies	at	 the	 firm	or	 industry	 level	 (Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2011;	
Hernandez	et	al.	2014;	Frederick	et	al.	2015).	
In	parallel,	 the	 literature	on	 structural	 change	has	been	enriched	with	new	evidence	
looking	 at	products	 at	 a	more	disaggregated	 level,	 rather	 than	broad	macro-sectors,	
proposing	the	notion	of	sophistication	as	key	to	 identifying	profitable	trajectories	 for	
structural	 change	 and	export	 upgrading	 (Hidalgo	 and	Hausmann	2009;	 Cristelli	 et	 al.	
2014;	Zhu	and	Fu	2013;	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	Waldemar	2013).	
Chapter	4	blends	these	two	streams	of	 literature	to	explore	the	association	between	





global	 markets	 and	 foreign,	 more	 productive,	 buyers,	 this	 is	 no	 guarantee	 that	
suppliers	will	easily	increase	the	sophistication	of	their	exports.		
In	 particular,	 this	 literature	 has	 emphasised	 that	 GVCs	 are	 ruled	 by	 lead	 firms	 that	
establish	 different	 kinds	 of	 governance	 and	 power	 relationships,	 determining	 who	
does	 what,	 and	 thus	 supplier’s	 possibilities	 of	 upgrading	 along	 the	 value	 chain	
(Kaplinsky	2013;	Gereffi	1994;	Gereffi	et	al.	2005).		
The	concept	of	export	upgrading	is	particularly	important	because	recent	contributions	
in	 the	 literature	 have	 better	 qualified	 the	 widely	 accepted	 positive	 relationship	
between	exports	and	growth,	by	introducing	the	quality	of	exports	as	a	determinant	of	
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firms’	 (and	 countries’)	 economic	 performance	 (Iacovone	 and	 Javorcik	 2009,	 2010;	
Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	Waldemar	2013;	Lall	et	al.	2006).	
Based	on	 this,	 the	 idea	of	export	 sophistication	has	become	central	 to	capturing	 the	
‘quality’	 of	 the	 exports,	 and	 an	 increasing	 body	 of	 evidence	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	




supplier’s	 upgrading	possibilities	 over	 the	past	 two	decades	 (Humphrey	 and	 Schmitz	
2002;	Giuliani	et	al.	2005;	Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2011).		
The	importance	of	buyer-supplier	relationships	has	also	been	emphasised	by	literature	
relying	 on	 micro-level	 transaction	 data.	 This	 literature	 has	 contended	 that	 mutual	
knowledge	 between	 buyers	 and	 suppliers	 is	 key	 to	 a	 relationship’s	 survival	 and	
profitability,	especially	in	the	context	of	low	contract	enforceability	(Macchiavello	and	
Morjaria	 2015,	 2016;	Macchiavello	 and	Miquel-Florensa	 2017).	 This	 latter	 stream	 of	
literature	 has,	 however,	 put	 little	 evidence	 forward	 concerning	 the	 linkage	 between	
power	asymmetries	in	trade	relationships	and	suppliers’	upgrading.		
We	attempt	to	fill	 this	gap	by	constructing	measures	of	power	 in	trade	relationships:	
we	 distinguish	 in	 particular	 between	 two	 kinds	 of	 power,	 based	 on	 its	 source:	 (i)	
relational	power	based	on	dyadic	features	of	the	relationship,	such	as	the	dependence	
of	 one	 party	 on	 the	 other,	 and	 (ii)	market	 power,	 i.e.	 the	 position	 that	 each	 of	 the	
trading	parties	occupies	in	the	market,	which	we	capture	with	market	shares.		









sophisticated	products.	A	 large	market	 size	of	 the	buyer	 is	positively	associated	with	
higher	levels	of	sophistication	of	trade.		











We	 also	 expand	 the	 literature	 on	 GVCs,	 qualifying	 the	 concept	 of	 power	 and	 its	
relationship	with	supplier’s	upgrading	in	a	more	nuanced	way.		
More	specifically,	we	find	that	different	kinds	of	power,	 i.e.	whether	they	stem	from	
buyer-supplier	mutual	 dependence	 or	 the	wider	market	 structure,	 are	 correlated	 in	
different	ways	to	both	sophistication	and	upgrading.		
These	 results	 are	 relevant	 both	 to	 firms	 that	 should	 take	 power	 asymmetries	 into	
account	when	attempting	to	enter	foreign	markets,	as	well	as	to	policy	makers	in	the	
design	of	policies	to	foster	domestic	suppliers’	engagement	with	global	markets.		
This	 is	 a	 first	 contribution	 based	 on	micro-level	 evidence,	 paving	 the	way	 for	 future	
research	on	inter-firms’	relationship	in	trade,	exploring	more	potential	factors	shaping	
power	 between	 trading	 partners,	 such	 as	 ownership	 relationships,	 size,	 productivity	
and	 technological	 capabilities	 of	 the	 buyer.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge	 these	 are	
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within	 a	 Global	 Value	 Chain	 (GVC)	 context.	 We	 consider	 trade	 specialisation	 in	 natural	
resources,	 high	 and	 low	 tech	 manufacturing	 and	 business	 services,	 before	 and	 after	 the	
financial	crisis.	The	aimed	contribution	of	 this	Chapter	 is	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	effects	of	 trade	
specialisation	 as	 measured	 in	 domestic	 value	 added	 embodied	 in	 exports	 rather	 than	 gross	
exports.	We	add	to	the	literature	on	GVCs	by:	(i)	studying	the	role	of	the	domestic	productive	
structure	 in	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation	 and	 performance,	 (ii)	 accounting	 for	 the	 rate	 of	
changes	 in	 trade	 specialisation	 as	 affecting	 GVC	 performance.	 We	 employ	 Balassa	 indexes	
based	on	value	added	flows	in	a	GMM	dynamic	panel	framework.		
We	 find	 that	 trade	 specialisation	 in	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 and	 natural	 resources	 have	 a	
negative	 impact	 on	 value	 added	 exported	 by	 countries.	 High-tech	 manufacturing	 and	
knowledge	intensive	services	exhibit	a	positive	effect	during	the	crisis	period.	We	discuss	these	




Countries’	 economic	 development	 and	 its	 relationship	with	 the	 productive	 structure	
has	been	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 long	 and	established	 literature,	 spanning	 several	 decades,	
looking	at	 the	 role	of	 specific	 sectors,	 such	as	agriculture,	manufacturing	ad	 services	
(Kaldor	 1968;	 Matsuyama	 2008;	 Szirmai	 and	 Verspagen	 2015),	 the	 linkages	 across	




In	 the	 past	 decades,	 globalisation	 has	 brought	 about	 a	 much	 higher	 degree	 of	
interdependence	 and	 interconnectedness	 across	 countries,	 also	 in	 trade	 flows.	 A	
consequence	of	 this,	 and	arguably	one	of	 the	most	 relevant	 changes	 in	 recent	years	
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concerning	 the	nature	of	 trade,	 is	 that	 intermediate	goods	account	 for	an	 increasing	
share	 of	 trade	 flows	 (OECD	 2013a).	 This	 is	 because	 production	 is	 scattered	 across	
countries,	and	global	value	chains	(GVCs)	represent	a	large	proportion	of	trade	(Gereffi	
1994;	 Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Baldwin	 and	 Robert-Nicoud	 2014).	 This	 Chapter	 studies	
countries’	export	performance	in	light	of	this	significant	change.		
Foreign	imported	inputs	constitute	an	increasing	share	of	gross	exports,	which	in	turn	
are	 less	 representative	 of	 countries’	 domestic	 production	 structure	 (Koopman	 et	 al.	
2014).	As	Baldwin	(2011,	p.33)	puts	it,	while	previously	“exporting	engines	was	a	sign	
of	 victory	 now	 it	 is	 a	 sign	 that	 the	 nation	 is	 located	 in	 a	 particular	 segment	 of	 an	
international	value	chain”.	Moreover,	 this	phenomenon	has	 turned	 foreign	countries	
not	only	into	export	destinations,	but	also	into	co-producers;	this	changes	the	way	in	
which	 we	 think	 about	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 export	
performance.		
In	light	of	the	growing	importance	of	GVCs,	this	Chapter	investigates	the	role	of	trade	
specialisation	 as	 a	 determinant	 of	 countries’	 export	 performance.	 In	 particular,	 we	




In	 addition,	 we	 characterise	 changes	 in	 trade	 specialisation,	 not	 only	 in	 terms	 of	
direction,	 i.e.	 in	which	 sectors	 a	 country	 specialises,	 but	 also	 in	 terms	of	 the	 rate	of	
change,	i.e.	the	speed	at	which	such	changes	occur.		
More	 specifically,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 countries’	 acceleration	 in	
specialisation	 and	 the	 growth	 of	 export	 shares.	 This	 is	 quite	 a	 novel	 approach,	 and	
complements	earlier	studies	on	countries’	trade	and	structural	change,	which	focus	on	
static	effects.		
We	 also	 include	 services	 (and	 in	 particular	 knowledge	 intensive	 business	 services	 -	
KIBS)	in	the	analysis	of	output	and	export	specialisation;	as	opposed	to	manufacturing,	
services	 have	 been	 comparatively	 overlooked	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 both	 trade	 and	
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structural	 change,	 despite	 some	 exceptions	 (Anderson	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Wolfmayr	 2012;	






growth	 of	 countries’	 share	 in	 domestic	 value	 added	 exported.	 We	 find	 that	 trade	








Our	 results	 are	 also	 relevant	 to	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 role	 of	 countries’	 trade	
specialisation	 and	 their	 performance	 (Hausmann	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Hidalgo	 et	 al.	 2007),	
which	 has	 so	 far	 overlooked	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 (Koopman	 et	 al.	 2014).	 We	
provide	 a	 richer	 understanding	 of	 trade	 specialisation,	 not	 only	 through	 our	 value	
added	approach,	but	also	looking	at	the	speed	of	changes	in	specialisation,	which	the	
literature	 has	 shown	 to	 have	 important	 effects	 on	 countries’	 long-term	 growth	
dynamics	(de	Vries	et	al.	2017;	Timmer	and	de	Vries	2009;	Timmer	et	al.	2014).		
The	remainder	of	 the	Chapter	 is	organised	as	 follows:	Section	2	reviews	the	relevant	
literature;	 Section	 3	 presents	 our	 value	 added	 based	 measures	 and	 some	 relevant	
descriptive	 evidence;	 Section	 4	 illustrates	 how	 they	 are	 computed	 and	 the	 overall	






There	 is	a	 long	standing	 literature	 looking	at	exports	as	a	driver	of	economic	growth	
(Balassa	1978;	Marin	1992).	The	export	sector	has	been	regarded	as	more	productive	
(Feder	1982)	 for	 reasons	 ranging	 from	access	 to	a	 larger	market,	economies	of	 scale	
and	 scope,	 technological	 spillovers,	 and	 incentives	 for	 exporters	 to	 increase	
productivity	 (Bustos	 2015;	 Rivera	 Batiz	 and	 Romer	 1991).	 Moreover,	 access	 to	
international	market	has	historically	played	an	 important	 role	 in	 the	development	of	
several	 developing	 countries,	 particularly	 in	 East	 Asia	 (Lee	 et	 al.	 2011;	 Kim	 and	 Lee	
1987;	Kim	1980;	Hobday	2015;	World	Bank	1993).	
Economic	 theory	 has	 mainly	 stressed	 the	 role	 of	 factor	 endowment	 in	 shaping	
countries’	comparative	advantage	and	specialisation	 in	 trade.	According	to	 this	view,	
countries	 should	 specialise	 in	 sectors	 in	 which	 they	 have	 a	 comparative	 advantage,	
regardless	of	the	sector’s	specific	characteristics.		
In	contrast	with	this	sector-neutral	approach,	some	economists	have	also	argued	that	
countries’	 specialisation	 and	 its	 changes	 reflect	 their	 technological	 capabilities,	
endogenous	technical	change	and	thus	their	competitiveness	(Fagerberg	1988;	Uchida	
and	Cook	2005).	 In	 this	 stream	of	 research,	 income	and	price	elasticities	 vary	across	
specialisation	 trajectories,	 determining	 demand	 and	 productivity	 growth	 dynamics	
(Thirlwall	1979).	So,	 trade	specialisation	and	trade	performance	 influence	each	other	
and,	 at	 times,	 countries	 go	 down	 specialisation	 patterns	 with	 low	 growth	 potential	
(Amable	2000)	as	shown,	for	instance,	by	Matsuyama	(1992)	for	the	agriculture	sector.		
A	more	 recent	 literature	 has	 looked	 at	 countries’	 trade	 specialisation,	 and	 revealed	
comparative	 advantage	 (RCA)	 in	 particular,	 to	 infer	 countries’	 underlying	 domestic	
capabilities.	Hidalgo	et	al.	 (2007)	and	Hausmann	and	Klinger	(2007)	have	argued	that	
countries’	 export	 specialisation	 reflects	 their	 domestic	 capabilities	 as	 well	 as	 their	
development	 perspectives.	 As	 a	 result,	 Hausmann	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 show	 that	 export	




underlying	 domestic	 economic	 structure	 and	 ultimately	 study	 how	 this	 evolves	 and	
affects	 long-term	 growth.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 account	 for	 the	 increasing	
fragmentation	 of	 production	 across	 countries	 that	 accompanies	 the	 emergence	 of	
global	value	chains	(GVCs)	and	the	limitations	of	using	gross	export	data	to	infer	on	the	
domestic	economic	structure	and	capabilities	(Baldwin	2012).		
The	 relationship	 between	 domestic	 productive	 structure	 and	 GVCs	 is	 not	 merely	 a	
methodological	 issue	 but	 represents	 a	 significant	 change	 in	 countries’	 specialisation	
opportunities.	 In	 fact,	while	 globalisation	has	 opened	up	new	 specialisation	 avenues	
for	countries	 (Baldwin	2011),	 this	has	yielded	rather	diverse	outcomes	as	developing	




Within	 the	 literature	 on	 structural	 change,	 manufacturing	 has	 traditionally	 been	
considered	as	the	engine	of	growth;	Szirmai	(2012)	provides	a	thorough	discussion	of	
the	 different	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 this	 hypothesis.	 The	 first	 Kaldor's	 Law	 (1968),	
postulates	 that	manufacturing	 share	 and	 economic	 growth	 are	 positively	 correlated,	
and	Verdoorn’s	Law	posits	a	positive	relationship	between	the	manufacturing	sector’s	
size	and	its	productivity.	Furthermore,	manufacturing	has	been	argued	to	have	many	
linkages	with	other	sectors,	 for	which	 it	provides	either	 inputs	or	demand	for	output	
(Hirschman	1958),	 as	well	 as	 opportunities	 for	 technology	 and	 knowledge	 spillovers.	
Rodrik	 (2013)	 finds	 that	 while	 the	 convergence	 between	 developing	 and	 advanced	
economies	 predicted	 by	 neoclassic	 growth	 models	 is	 conditional	 on	 a	 set	 of	 other	
factors,	 such	 as	 education	 and	 institutions,	 productivity	 in	 the	manufacturing	 sector	
shows	unconditional	convergence,	i.e.	irrespective	of	countries’	characteristics.		
Recent	 evidence	 seems	 to	 question	 whether	 manufacturing	 is	 still	 playing	 its	
traditional	role	of	a	growth	engine.	In	another	contribution,	Rodrik	(2015a)	argues	that	
rapid	 industrialisation	 for	 developing	 countries	 is	 going	 to	 be	 more	 difficult	 in	 the	




now	 needed	 in	 order	 for	 manufacturing	 to	 trigger	 its	 engine	 of	 growth	 effect.	 This	
evidence	 suggests	 that	 specialisation	 in	 high-	 and	 low-tech	manufacturing	may	 yield	
different	outcomes	in	terms	of	countries’	economic	performance.		
Services	have	traditionally	not	been	considered	to	exert	the	same	virtuous	properties	




in	 the	 past;	 for	 this	 reason,	 he	 raises	 concerns	 for	 its	 implication	 for	 low-income	
countries’	growth	perspectives.		
In	 contrast	with	 this	 view	on	 the	contribution	of	 services	 to	economic	development,	
recent	 studies	on	 the	emergence	of	GVCs	 in	 services	have	provided	evidence	on	 the	
opportunities	 of	 offshoring	 service	 activities	 from	 developed	 towards	 developing	
countries	 (Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2010;	Hernandez	et	al.	2014).	However,	most	
of	 the	 studies	 in	 this	 strand	 of	 work	 take	 a	 qualitative	 approach,	 while	 little	
quantitative	evidence	has	been	offered	so	far	to	the	debate	around	GVCs	and	the	role	
of	services	in	developing	countries.		
While	the	body	of	 literature	on	the	direction	of	structural	change	 is	vast,	still	 little	 is	
known	 on	 the	 dynamic	 effects	 of	 the	 pace	 at	 which	 countries	 specialise	 on	 their	
growth	rate.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	speed	at	which	structural	change	takes	place	
is	 key	 to	 countries’	 successful	 development	 (Haraguchi	 2014;	 Matsuyama	 1992).	
McMillan	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 stress	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 dynamic	 effects	 of	 structural	
change,	distinguishing	between	structural	change	that	is	growth	enhancing	or	growth	




in	 the	 former	 structural	 change	 has	 favoured	 sectors	 with	 higher	 productivity	
dynamics,	this	has	not	happened	in	the	latter	(Timmer	et	al.	2014).	More	specifically,	
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Asian	 economies	 have	 moved	 towards	 manufacturing	 sectors	 that	 had	 a	 faster	






countries	 specialise	 in	 sectors	 with	 high	 value	 added	 content,	 in	 order	 to	 reap	 the	
benefits	of	 the	 first-mover.	Furthermore	 it	 is	 important	 that	countries	maintain	 their	
ability	to	specialise	quickly	so	they	can	sustain	a	rent,	deriving	from	constantly	moving	
towards	new	high-value	added	sectors	(Kaplinsky	2004).		
For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 to	 look	 at	 rates	 of	 change,	 rather	 than	
levels,	in	both	export	performance	and	specialisation.		
2.2.3	Research	question	and	Chapter’s	contribution	




representative	of	 the	 latter.	This	 requires	a	novel	understanding	of	 trade	 flows:	 they	
are	no	longer	the	outcome	of	exchanges	of	finished	goods	produced	within	countries’	














We	bring	 this	 hypothesis	 to	 the	data	by	 computing	measures	of	 trade	 specialisation	
and	 of	 trade	 performance.	 In	 order	 to	 account	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 and	 to	
explore	the	relationship	between	exports	and	domestic	specialisation,	we	build	on	the	












literature	 is	 that	 GVC	 participation	 is	 desirable	 and	 that	 it	 should	 lead	 to	 economic	
growth.	Without	making	 such	 an	 assumption,	 Banga	 (2014)	 argues	 that	 linking	 into	
GVCs	is	not	necessarily	enough	to	trigger	export-led	growth.	As	an	alternative	measure	
of	countries’	GVC	performance,	she	proposes	to	use	the	difference	between	backward	





in	 GVCs.	 They	 look	 at	 domestic	 value	 added	 embodied	 in	 countries’	 exports	 (DVA,	
henceforth),	 which	 corresponds	 to	 the	 share	 of	 exports	 that	 is	 used	 to	 remunerate	
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domestic	 labour	 and	 capital.	 This	measure	 captures	 the	parts	of	 countries’	 domestic	
productive	 structure	 that	 can	 compete	 in	 the	 international	 market	 and	 ultimately	
contributes	to	their	export.		
In	 order	 to	measure	 countries’	 performance	 in	GVCs,	we	 thus	 follow	Kowalski	 et	 al.	
(2015)	and	opt	for	DVA	as	our	main	variable	of	interest,	which	we	use	to	compute	both	




country	 value	added	exported	by	one	 sector	may	be	generated	by	different	 sectors.	
This	 measure	 thus	 allows	 reallocating	 value	 added	 to	 the	 sector	 that	 originated	 it	
rather	 than	 the	 one	 that	 exported	 it.	 This	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 when	 looking	 at	




an	 increasing	 growth	 rate	 in	 DVA	 share	 is	 arguably	 a	 manifestation	 of	 countries’	
increasing	competitiveness	in	the	export	markets	(Kowalski	et	al.	2015a).	
The	 literature	has	yet	 to	 reach	a	 consensus	on	a	 single	approach	 to	measuring	DVA.	
Koopman	et	al.	(2014)	suggest	using	a	vector	of	gross	exports	including	both	final	and	
intermediate	 foreign	 demand.	 Johnson	 (2018)	 points	 out	 that	 in	 Koopman	 et	 al.’s	










We	 use	 the	 Inter-Country	 Input-Output	 (ICIO)	 tables	 compiled	 by	 the	 OECD,	 and	
compute	countries’	DVA	shares	and	value	added	RCA	in	four	sector	groups:	knowledge	




are	 compared	 with	 their	 gross	 export	 homologues,	 especially	 when	 looking	 at	
countries’	 trade	 specialisation.	 This	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 when	 countries	 export	





tradable;	 as	 a	 consequence	 their	 contribution	 to	 a	 country’s	 export	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
indirect,	e.g.	KIBS	value	added	provided	domestically	contributing	to	the	gross	export	
of	 manufacturing.	 For	 this	 reason	 gross	 export	 figure	 may	 underestimate	 KIBS	
importance	for	countries’	export	and	therefore	the	countries’	trade	specialisation.	
Manufacturing	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 usually	 consists	 of	 tradable	 products,	 whose	
production	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 fragmented	 across	 countries.	 For	 this	 reason	 gross	 export	
figures	 may	 be	 overestimated,	 due	 to	 the	 large	 share	 of	 imported	 inputs	 that	 are	
included	in	gross	export.	
Figure	2.1	below	shows	how	 the	average	RCA	 in	KIBS	over	 the	years	 changes	across	
countries	 when	 using	measures	 based	 on	 gross	 exports	 or	 DVA.	We	 take	 KIBS	 as	 a	
particular	example	since,	as	we	have	already	pointed	out,	this	sector	is	more	likely	to	
be	exported	indirectly	through	manufactured	exports.	However,	the	same	pattern	can	
																																																								1 We provide a more formalised explanation of how this measure is computed in the Appendix. 
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be	found	looking	at	the	other	three	macro-sectors	 in	our	analysis2.	Regardless	of	the	
mechanisms	 at	 play,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 using	 a	 value	 added	 approach,	 as	









such	as	Chile,	 France,	Germany,	 Italy	or	 Japan,	 the	gross	export	RCA	underestimates	
their	 trade	specialisation	 in	KIBS.	 In	contrast,	 countries	 such	as	Luxembourg,	 the	UK,	
Cyprus,	 Ireland,	 India	 and	 Singapore,	 see	 their	 RCA	 increase	 significantly	 when	
measured	in	gross	exports.		
																																																								2 Figures A1-A3 in the Appendix report the same comparison between gross exports and domestic value 
added for the other three sector groups, NR, LTM and HTM, respectively. 
32		
It	 is	 important	to	stress	that	using	gross	exports	does	not	move	all	RCAs	 in	the	same	
direction,	which	makes	 the	bias	 of	 using	 of	 gross	 exports	 particularly	 relevant	when	
studying	trade	specialisation.	The	distribution	of	the	two	variables	differs	substantially,	
which	means	that	estimates	based	on	gross	exports	may	lead	to	incorrect	conclusions:	
RCAs	 based	 on	 gross	 exports	 capture	 values	 exported	 by	 services	 but	 possibly	
originating	 from	 other	 sectors	 (and	 countries),	 while	 they	 leave	 out	 value	 added	
originating	 from	 domestic	 services	 but	 exported	 by	 other	 sectors.	 This	 arguably	
explains	 the	 difference	 between	DVA	 and	 gross	 export-based	RCAs:	 sectors	 that	 are	
less	 tradable,	 such	as	 services,	may	be	 traded	 through	other	 sectors’	 exports,	which	
would	only	be	captured	by	DVA-based	RCA.		
In	 support	of	 this	 conjecture	we	 see	 in	 Figure	2.1	 that	 gross	export	RCA	 inflates	 the	
KIBS	 specialisation	of	 countries	 that	are	direct	exporters	of	 services	 (such	as	 the	UK,	
Luxembourg,	Singapore,	and	India),	while	 it	underestimates	the	service	specialisation	
of	 countries	 that	 are	 direct	 exporters	 of	 other	 sectors	 but	 that	 also	 have	 significant	
domestic	provision	of	services	(such	as	Australia,	France,	Germany,	and	Japan).		




Within	 this	 value	 added	 based	 approach	we	 are	 particularly	 interested	 in	 looking	 at	
how	the	evolution	of	countries	export	structure	 in	relation	to	trade	performance	has	
changed	 over	 time.	 We	 find	 some	 significant	 heterogeneity	 of	 these	 measures	 of	
specialisation	when	we	distinguish	between	high-income	and	developing	countries	 in	
our	sample3.	In	Figure	2.2	we	see	that	developing	countries	tend	to	have	much	starker	
specialisations,	 especially	 in	natural	 resources	and	 low-tech	manufacturing,	 although	
this	seems	to	decrease	over	time.	We	note	an	increase	over	time	of	the	specialisation	
in	high-tech	manufacturing;	however,	this	remains	smaller	than	high-income	countries.	
Developing	 countries	 seem	 to	 have	 been	 specialising	 away	 from	 KIBS,	 showing	 a	
slightly	decreasing	trend.																																																										3 We use the WB threshold of US$ 12,236 of GDP per capita. Table A1.2 reports number of years in which 
each country is above this threshold and therefore considered as high-income. 
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It	 is	worth	bearing	 in	mind	that	this	does	not	contradict	the	evidence	Rodrik	(2015b)	
puts	 forward	 concerning	 countries’	 premature	 deindustrialisation	 and	 shift	 towards	
services;	 Rodrik	 refers	 to	 low-productivity	 services,	 such	 as	 retail	 or	 non-tradable	
services,	that	are	not	KIBS.		
High-income	 countries	 have	 more	 homogeneous	 specialisations,	 with	 the	 RCA	 KIBS	
being	 consistently	 above	 1.	 On	 average,	 natural	 resources	 also	 exhibit	 a	 high	 RCA	
among	high-income	countries,	which	 is	most	 likely	explained	by	 the	presence	of	 few	




with	 the	 established	 view	 that,	 as	 income	 in	 countries	 increases,	 their	 specialisation	
tends	 to	move	away	 from	manufacturing	 towards	 services	 (Bah	2011).	 The	different	
specialisation	between	developing	and	high-income	economies	can	also	be	explained	
by	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 productive	 activities,	 in	 particular	 the	 offshoring	 of	
manufacturing	 towards	 developing	 countries	 with	 lower	 wages,	 while	 higher	 value	
added	 activities	 have	 been	 retained	 in	 high	 income	 economies;	 Baldwin	 and	 Lopez-
Gonzalez	(2015)	refer	to	these	as	head-quarter	economies.		
The	 fact	 that	 high-income	 countries	 tend	 to	 have	more	 homogeneous	 specialisation	
across	 sectors,	 and	 be	 more	 specialised	 in	 high-tech	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	
industries,	 is	 also	 to	 be	 expected.	 This	 is	 because	more	 advanced	 and	 sophisticated	
economies	will	 have	 a	 larger	 set	 of	 capabilities	 and	 therefore	 be	 able	 to	 produce	 a	








Overall	 it	 seems	 that,	 over	 time,	 countries	 have	 specialised	 away	 from	 low-tech	
manufacturing	 (especially	 high-income	 ones)	 and	 natural	 resources	 (especially	



















developing	 and	 high-income	 countries.	 Specialisation	 in	 natural	 resources	 and	 low-
tech	manufacturing	seem	to	have	changed	the	most,	with	a	decreasing	trend,	over	the	
years.	 In	contrast,	 specialisation	 in	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing	has	been	more	
stable	over	the	years,	despite	a	decreasing	trend	among	developing	countries.	





We	 also	 know	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 export	 specialisation	 and	 economic	
performance	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 reverse	 causality	 (Amable	 2000)	 and	 serial	




In	 the	previous	 section	we	 reviewed	 the	growing	 literature	on	measurement	of	GVC	
participation	 and	 DVA	 in	 particular,	 arguing	 that	 such	 an	 approach	would	 allow	 the	
capturing	of	countries’	domestic	contribution	to	exports	in	a	more	accurate	way.		






















containing	each	 country	 i’s	 and	 sector	 j’s	domestic	 value	added	 in	exports.	We	 then	
aggregate	across	all	sectors	and	obtain	our	variable	DVA.		
We	then	take	each	country	 i’s	 share	 in	worldwide	 flows	of	DVA,	and	divide	 it	by	 the	
share	the	country	represents	of	the	world	population	as	follows:	
𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐻 = 𝐷𝑉𝐴!𝐷𝑉𝐴!!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!!  





𝑅𝐶𝐴!" =  𝐷𝑉𝐴!"𝐷𝑉𝐴!𝐷𝑉𝐴!"! 𝐷𝑉𝐴!!  
We	use	the	share	that	our	sector	of	interest	j	represents	in	the	domestic	value	added	
embodied	 in	 the	 exports	 of	 country	 i	 and	weight	 this	 with	 the	 share	 that	 domestic	
value	added	 from	sector	 j	 represents	 in	world	wide	value	added	 flows.	We	compute	
this	RCA	index	for	four	groups	of	industries:	KIBS,	NR,	LTMF	and	HTMF4.	
So,	 the	 general	 form	 of	 the	 estimated	 equation	 in	 our	 econometric	 analysis	 is	 the	
following:		
𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑠ℎ! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑠ℎ!!!+𝛽!𝑡𝑓𝑝! + 𝛽!𝑘𝑖𝑏𝑠!"!! + 𝛽!𝑛𝑟_𝑟𝑐𝑎!+ 𝛽!𝑙𝑡𝑚𝑓_𝑟𝑐𝑎! + 𝛽!ℎ𝑡𝑚𝑓_𝑟𝑐𝑎! + 𝛽!𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙! + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠!+ 𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝜀! 
																																																								4 A detailed breakdown of how these sectors are aggregated is provided in the Appendix in Table A1 
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Where	dvasht	is	the	growth	rate	of	DVASH	at	time	t,	and	all	variables	are	expressed	in	
changes;	αt	 and	αi	 are	 year	 and	 country	 fixed	 effects	 (FE)	 respectively;	 _rcat	 are	 the	
growth	rates	of	the	RCA	of	the	four	groups	of	industries	discussed	above.	
Both	human	capital	and	 technological	 capabilities	play	a	 significant	 role	 in	countries’	
trade	 specialisation	 and	 competitiveness	 (Guerrieri	 and	 Meliciani	 2005).	 For	 this	
reason	we	 control	 for	 both	 of	 them,	 using	 gross	 enrolment	 in	 secondary	 education	
(secenrol)	 and	 Internet	users	per	1,000	 inhabitants	 (internetaccess),	both	 taken	 from	
the	World	Bank’s	World	Development	Indicators.		
Finally,	we	also	acknowledge	 that	having	 such	aggregated	data	may	not	 capture	 the	




deal	with	this	 issue	we	also	control	 for	countries’	 total	 factor	productivity	 (tfp)	using	
the	Penn	World	Tables.	
We	perform	our	analysis	using	 the	 system	generalised	methods	of	moments	 (GMM)	
developed	by	Blundell	and	Bond	(1998),	which	deals	more	efficiently	with	models	with	
high	persistence	 like	ours	 than	the	 first-differences	GMM	developed	by	Arellano	and	
Bond	 (1991).	 We	 estimate	 the	 two-step	 robust	 version	 of	 system	 GMM	 with	 the	
Windmeijer	correction	to	deal	with	heteroscedasticity	and	 finite	sample	 (Windmeijer	
2005).		
Using	 GMM	 allows	 us	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 potential	 reverse	 causality	 that	 could	 affect	







Finally,	 we	 opt	 for	 an	 autoregressive	model	 as	 exports	 in	 panel	 data	 often	 present	
serial	correlation.	This	means	that	the	outcome	variable	and	 its	 lag	are	correlated	by	
construction	 through	 the	 FE,	 and	 that	 OLS	 estimators	 would	 be	 biased	 and	




The	 ICIO	 data	 cover	 a	 rather	 long	 span	 of	 time	 including	 the	 financial	 crisis	 (2007	
onwards),	which	we	have	 seen	 shows	 a	 significantly	 different	 pattern	 from	previous	
years.		
Table	 2.1	 reports	 the	 results	 of	 our	main	model	 results	 for	 all	 years	 available	 in	our	





































countries’	 share	 in	domestic	 value	added	 in	exports.	The	 four	 sector	groups	are:	 knowledge	 intensive	







Low-tech	 manufacturing	 also	 has	 a	 negative	 impact	 on	 our	 outcome	 variable,	 both	




2.3);	 second,	 while	 manufacturing	 has	 traditionally	 been	 regarded	 as	 the	 engine	 of	
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period	 offered	 by	 Szirmai	 and	 Verspagen	 (2015).	 They	 examine	 structural	 change	
between	 1950	 and	 2005,	 and,	 in	 the	 last	 decade,	 find	 a	 slowing	 down	 of	
manufacturing’s	beneficial	effect	on	growth	and	an	increased	dependence	on	human	
capital	for	manufacturing	to	be	exerting	its	traditional	role	of	engine	of	growth.		
Concerning	KIBS,	we	do	not	detect	 any	 significant	effect,	 except	a	weakly	 significant	
and	 positive	 coefficient	 for	 the	 crisis	 years.	 These	 results	 do	 not	 allow,	 however,	
considering	 as	 unwarranted	 Rodrik's	 (2015b)	 concerns	 with	 respect	 to	 developing	




evidence,	 our	 specialisation	 measures	 exhibit	 significant	 heterogeneity	 across	
countries	based	on	the	development	level	of	the	country.	We	try	to	account	for	this	by	
including	 total	 factor	productivity	as	a	 control,	which	has	a	 consistently	positive	and	
significant	effect,	as	expected.		
We	wish	 to	 explore	more	 in	 depth	whether	 specialisation	 in	 any	of	 our	 four	macro-
sectors	 has	 different	 impacts	 on	 countries	 depending	 on	 their	 income	 level.	 We	












































countries’	 share	 in	domestic	 value	added	 in	exports.	The	 four	 sector	groups	are:	 knowledge	 intensive	









When	 controlling	 for	 income	 levels	 we	 find	 some	 interesting	 results,	 although	 it	 is	




found	 in	 our	 previous	 specification.	 Natural	 resources,	while	maintaining	 a	 negative	
sign,	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 any	 significant	 impact	 on	 export	 share	 growth,	 once	we	
control	 for	 countries	 levels	 of	 income.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	
increasing	 specialisation	 in	 this	 sector	 on	 countries’	 DVA	 share	 depends	 on	 income	
rather	 than	 the	 natural	 resource	 sector	 per	 se.	 Interestingly,	 we	 also	 find	 high-tech	
manufacturing	and	KIBS	to	exert	positive	effects,	although	only	during	the	crisis	years,	
i.e.	from	2007	onwards;	this	suggests	that	when	global	demand	contracts,	this	is	likely	
to	 affect	 less	 high-tech	manufacturing	 and	 KIBS.	 Concerning	 the	 latter,	 this	 result	 is	
consistent	with	our	findings	in	Table	2.1.		
While	we	find	no	evidence	concerning	the	long-term	effect	of	increasing	specialisation	
in	 technology	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	 sectors	 on	 countries’	 export	 shares,	 these	




This	 Chapter	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 acceleration	 in	 the	 pace	 of	 trade	
specialisation	on	countries’	trade	performance.	We	also	explore	which	sectors	provide	
a	beneficial	specialisation	path.		
This	 Chapter	 shows	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 has	 increased	 the	 divide	 between	





We	 take	 such	 an	 approach	 to	 compute	 both	 our	 specialisation	 measures	 and	 the	
export	 shares	 of	 each	 country.	 This	 methodological	 novelty	 reflects	 a	 different	
theoretical	 understanding	 of	 trade	 flows	 that	 are	 not	 the	 outcome	 of	 countries	
independent	 production	 but	 rather	 of	 cross-country	 interdependencies.	 This	 is	 the	
result	 of	 the	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 and	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 that	make	 gross	





to	ensure	 that	changes	 in	gross	export	specialisation	also	drive	changes	 in	countries’	
domestic	productive	structure.		
In	 addition	 to	 this	 novel	 view	 on	 trade	 specialisation,	 which	 can	 now	 be	 linked	 to	
domestic	economic	structure,	we	also	look	at	the	dynamics	of	specialisation	trajectory	
and	its	outcome	in	terms	of	export	shares.		
We	 find	 evidence	 that	 is,	 broadly	 speaking,	 in	 line	 with	 the	 large	 literature	 on	
manufacturing,	 in	 particular	 the	 most	 recent	 contributions	 highlighting	 a	 potential	
change	in	the	role	of	this	sector	for	economic	growth.	While	taking	a	methodologically	
different	approach,	our	 results	 support	 the	 findings	of	Szirmai	and	Verspagen	 (2015)	
who	 look	 at	 structural	 change	 between	 1950	 and	 2005	 and	 find	 that	 “since	 1990,	
manufacturing	 is	becoming	a	 somewhat	more	difficult	 route	 to	growth	 than	before”	
(Szirmai	and	Verspagen	2015,	p.58).		
Our	results	also	suggest	that	countries	increasing	their	specialisation	towards	low-tech	




Another,	 speculative,	 explanation	 could	 be	 that	 before	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs,	
specialisation	in	low-tech	manufacturing	would	also	foster	domestic	linkages	with	the	
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although	 in	 the	 last	 decade	 its	 effects	 on	 growth	 seem	 to	 be	 fading	 (Rodrik	 2016a;	
Szirmai	and	Verspagen	2015;	Szirmai	2012).	From	a	development	standpoint,	high-tech	










although	 an	 emerging	 stream	 of	 research	 has	 been	 looking	 at	 the	 off-shoring	 of	
services	towards	developing	countries,	as	a	consequence	of	the	emergence	of	service	
GVCs,	in	a	rather	optimistic	way	(Gary	Gereffi	and	Fernandez-Stark	2010).		
Our	 results	 offer	 no	 strong	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 increased	
specialisation	 in	KIBS	may	be	beneficial	 to	countries’	export	performance	 in	 the	 long	
run.	We	 find,	 as	 for	 high-tech	manufacturing,	 a	 positive	 effect	 only	 during	 the	 crisis	
years.	Overall,	this	evidence	seem	to	justify	Rodrik’s	concern	about	what	he	refers	to	
as	premature	de-industrialisation	of	developing	countries	(Rodrik	2016a,	2015b).	From	
a	 policy	 perspective,	 it	 also	 warrants	 caution	 when	 considering	 the	 increasing	 off-
shoring	 of	 services	 (Fernandez-Stark	 and	 Gereffi,	 2011)	 as	 a	 new	 developmental	




Our	 results	 are	 somewhat	weakened	 by	 the	 high	 level	 of	 aggregation	 and	 relatively	
short	time	span	covered	by	our	data.	Related	to	this,	another	shortcoming	of	the	data	
is	also	the	relative	 low	number	of	observations,	which	may	question	the	reliability	of	
the	GMM.	This	methodology	 is	 designed	 for	 instances	with	a	 small	 number	of	 years	
but	 a	 large	 number	 of	 observations	 for	 each	 cross-section;	 to	mitigate	 this	we	have	
tried	 several	 combination	 of	 instruments,	 choosing	 the	 most	 robust	 ones	 and	 also	
relying	on	the	Hansen	and	Arellano	tests	for	overidentification	and	serial	correlation,	
respectively.	 	 Taking	 stock	 on	 this	 however,	 future	 research	 should	 look	 at	 more	
disaggregated	sectors	over	longer	time	periods.		
Exploring	 trade	 in	 value	 added	 at	 a	 more	 granular	 level	 is	 crucial	 because	 trade	 is	
involving	 more	 and	 more	 intermediates,	 and	 production	 is	 increasingly	 being	
fragmented	 across	 countries	 in	 terms	 of	 tasks	 rather	 than	 products	 (Grossman	 and	
Rossi-Hansberg	2006;	 Lanz	 et	 al.	 2011):	working	with	 aggregated	manufacturing	 and	
services	 categories	 may	 hide	 substantial	 differences.	 An	 additional	 advantage	 of	
focusing	on	tasks	across	sectors	is	that	this	allows	exploring	the	relationship	between	
the	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 and	 employment	 related	 issues	 such	 as	 skills	
requirement	and	wages.	Unfortunately	 there	 is	 still	a	 lack	of	 reliable	data	 to	explore	
these	 issues	 at	 a	 high	 level	 of	 disaggregation	 both	 in	 high-income	 and	 especially	 in	
developing	countries.	
Moreover,	 the	 increasing	 fragmentation	of	production	across	countries,	and	 the	blur	
of	 the	 divide	 between	manufacturing	 and	 services,	 brings	 up	 the	 issue	 of	 domestic	
inter-sectoral	 linkages.	 This	 in	 turn	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	







The	 Chapter	 puts	 forward	 and	 empirically	 tests	 the	 conjecture	 that	 specialisation	 in	 Natural	
Resource	Industries	(NRI)	might	not	necessarily	be	a	“curse”	for	(developing)	countries,	to	the	




backward	 linked	 sectors	 such	 as	 Knowledge	 Intensive	 Business	 Services	 (KIBS)	 or	 high	 tech	





Countries	 rich	 in	 or	 dependent	 on	 Natural	 Resources	 (NR)5	 might	 be	 “blessed”	 or	




now	 commonly	 referenced.	 This	 is	 since	 the	 publication	 of	 a	 widely	 cited	 work	 by	
Sachs	 and	Warner	 (Sachs	 and	Warner	 1995,	 1997).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 the	 “curse”	 thesis	
argues	 that	 countries	 rich	 in	 or	 dependent	 on	 NR	 experience	 low	 and/or	 stagnant	
growth	performance,	with	detrimental	consequences	for	their	development	(Venables	
2016;	Harding	and	Venables	2016).																																																										5	 NR	 is	 commonly	 intended	 to	 be	 non-renewable	 extractive	 industries	 such	 as	 oil	 and	 gas.	 The	
renewables,	such	as	forestry,	water,	 land	that	produce	raw	material	and	commodities,	usually	fall	 into	
the	primary	activities.	Here	we	look	at	both	types	of	sectors,	as	detailed	below.	The	literature	on	the	NR	




The	 theoretical	 explanations	 and	 empirical	 grounding	 of	 the	 NR	 curse	 include	 a	
classical	argument	of	factors	crowding-out,	i.e.	production	inputs	that	are	moved	away	
from	non-resources	activities,	as	well	as	trade	related	issues	such	as	the	worsening	of	
the	 balance	 of	 payment	 and	 terms	 of	 trade	 due	 to	 the	 contraction	 of	 the	 non-
resources	tradable	sectors	(the	well-known	Dutch	disease,	more	below)	(Corden	1982;	
Corden	 1984)	 and	 the	 volatility	 of	 commodity6	 prices,	 which	 makes	 resource	 rents	
uncertain.	 Moreover	 natural	 resource	 rich	 countries	 will	 miss	 the	 learning-by-doing	
opportunity,	stemming	from	the	maintenance	of	a	core	non-resource	(manufacturing	
mainly)	 sector	 (Torvik	 2001).	 Finally,	 the	 scholarship	 has	 also	 noted	 a	 negative	
association	of	NR	dependence	with	quality	of	institutions	(Mehlum	et	al.	2006).		
It	 is	also	worth	noting	 tha	a	high	heterogeneity	 in	 the	 type	of	natural	 resources	 (i.e.	
coal	 rather	 than	oil	 or	diamonds),	 levels	of	 initial	 investments,	quality	of	 institutions	
and	 the	public	management	of	 rents	 (Havranek	et	 al.	 2016)	make	 the	presence	of	 a	
“curse”	 largely	heterogeneous	across	countries.	The	 literature	has	 identified	cases	of	
growth-adverse	NR	dependence	 (e.g.	 RDC,	Angola,	 and	many	African	 countries)	 that	
are	 counter-balanced	 by	 cases	 of	 a	 growth-enhancing	 one	 (e.g.	 Botswana,	 Norway,	
Chile,	 Australia)	 (Venables	 2016).	 Overall,	 the	 latest	 two	 decades	 of	 scholarship	 has	
shown	 large	 country	 heterogeneity	 on	 the	 presence	 of	 an	 NR	 “curse”,	 so	 that	 a	






link	 between	 NR	 and	 non-resource	 sector	 exports,	 with	 a	 particular	 interest	 in	
developing	 countries	 (Torvik	 2001;	 Harding	 and	 Venables	 2016).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	
that,	because	NR	exports	might	be	detrimental	to	non-resource	tradables,	it	is	difficult	





to	 achieve	 diversification	 through	 industrial	 policies	 and	 “move	 away”	 from	 NR	
(Harding	and	Venables	2016;	Venables	2016).		
The	 issue	of	diversification	 in	NR	rich	countries,	 traditionally	envisaged	as	away	from	
NRI,	towards	an	(export-driven)	manufacturing	sector,	calls	for	adequate	attention	to	
the	role	of	the	structure	of	the	domestic	economy.	The	importance	of	the	structure	of	




policies	 is	not	new,	and	dates	back	 to	 the	seminal	work	by	development	economists	
such	as	Hirschman	and	Rostow	 (Hirschman,	1958;	Rostow,	1960).7	Hirschman	took	a	
remarkably	 original	 stand	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 mainstream	 growth	 theory	 based	 on	
factor	 endowments.	 The	 role	 of	 linkages	 in	Hirschman’s	work	 serves	 the	 purpose	of	
creating	 new	 sectors	 by	 way	 of	 scalable	 intermediate	 demand,	 and	 therefore	
represents	 a	 useful	 device	 to	 identify	 strategies	 of	 industrial	 policy	 that	 favour	
diversification	of	the	sectoral	composition	of	economies.		
When	it	comes	to	the	issue	of	diversifying	away	from	NR,	the	linkages	framework,	and	
specifically	 the	 argument	 of	 beneficiation	 (that	 is	 the	 development	 of	 downstream,	
forward-linked	manufacturing	industries	that	process	raw	materials	and	NR)	has	been	
criticised	despite	a	substantial	paucity	of	recent	specific	contributions.	Hausmann	et	al.	
(2008),	 for	 instance,	 argue	 that	 policies	 aimed	 at	 beneficiation	 are	 misguided,	 as	
diversification	 should	 be	 based	 on	 similarity	 of	 factor	 and	 technological	 capabilities	
intensity	 rather	 than	 vertical	 linkages,	 most	 especially	 when	 NR	 is	 concerned.	 The	
argument,	within	the	product	space	framework	(Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Hausmann	et	al.	
2007),	 seems	 to	 have	 been	 crafted	 only	 with	 respect	 to	 beneficiation	 (i.e.	 forward-
linked	 industries),	 rather	 than	 to	backward-linked	ones,	 that	are	 those	 that	could	be	
demanded	by	NRI	as	intermediate	inputs.																																																										7	 According	 to	 Hirschman	 (1958),	 there	 are	 different	 types	 of	 externalities,	 depending	 on	 whether	
activities	 are	 related	 to	 one	 another	 by	 backward	 or	 forward	 inducement	 mechanisms,	 i.e.	 whether	




This	 Chapter	 aims	 to	 revisit	 the	 role	 of	 Hirschman	 linkages,	 particularly	 of	 NR	
backward-linked	 business	 services,	 to	 identify	 whether	 new	 patterns	 of	 export	
diversification	 in	 NR	 rich	 countries	 can	 emerge,	 depending	 on	 the	 revealed	
comparative	 advantage	 in	NR	of	 countries,	 and	by	distinguishing	between	extractive	
industries	and	agriculture.	We	aim	therefore	to	contribute	to	the	NR	curse	debate	by	
offering	a	novel	perspective	and	empirical	 evidence	 that	might	 ground	a	whole	new	
set	of	reflections	on	how	to	craft	industrial,	trade	and	development	policies	for	NR-rich	
emerging	countries.		
We	 claim	 that	 for	 NR-rich	 countries,	 many	 of	 which	 are	 emerging	 economies,	 a	
specialisation	in	NRI	might	not	necessarily	be	a	“curse”,	to	the	extent	that	it	provides	
opportunities	 for	 export	 diversification	 in	 backward-linked	 sectors	 à	 la	 Hirschman.	
Such	 opportunities	 might	 be	 based	 on	 virtuous	 pathways	 of	 domestic	 structural	
change	 that	 do	 not	 necessarily	 involve	 “moving	 away”	 from	NRI,	 but	 use	 them	as	 a	
platform	 to	 sectoral	 (and	 technological)	 upgrade	 towards	 directions	 that	 have	 not	
often	been	 considered,	 let	 alone	as	 virtuous	ones,	 such	as	backward-linked	business	
services.		
A	 previous	 work	 (López-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 2015)	 put	 forward	 a	 Hirschman-Linder	
conjecture	on	the	determinants	of	participation	in	business	services	(BS)	Global	Value	
Chains	(GVCs)	and	found	empirical	support	for	it.	We	have	argued	that	participation	in	








la	 Linder	 for	 backward-linked	 sectors	 such	 as	 Knowledge	 Intensive	 Business	 Services	
(KIBS)8.	 Should	 this	 be	 the	 case,	 there	 would	 be	 an	 opportunity	 to	 spur	 export																																																									8	We	also	test	our	conjecture	by	looking	at	high-tech	manufacturing.		
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diversification	in	sectors	such	as	KIBS.	This	would	create	a	whole	new	narrative	around	
NR	and	 trade	and	development	policy	“when	backward	and	 forward	 linkage	matter”	
(Baldwin	and	Venables	2015),	albeit	with	a	set	of	sectors	so	far	overlooked.		
We	 empirically	 test	 our	 conjecture	 within	 a	 general	 method	 of	 moments	 (GMM)	
dynamic	framework,	to	ascertain	whether	the	domestic	 intermediate	demand	arising	
from	the	NR	sector,	distinguishing	between	extractive	industries	and	agriculture9,	has	




find	 that	countries,	particularly	 those	with	a	 revealed	comparative	advantage	 in	NRI,	
and	 particularly	 agriculture,	 benefit	 from	 a	 sufficient	 ‘representative	 domestic	
demand’	for	KIBS	coming	from	NRI,	which	favours	trade	in	KIBS	value	added.	Our	main	
results	 also	 hold	 when	 looking	 at	 domestic	 intermediate	 demand	 for	 high	 tech	
manufacturing	 sectors,	 though	 we	 find	 stronger	 support	 for	 such	 an	 effect	 to	 exist	
between	the	mining,	rather	than	agriculture,	and	manufacturing	sector.		
These	 results	 seem	 to	 corroborate	 the	 idea	 that	 vertical	 linkages	matter	 in	 the	 first	
place	and	that	the	presence	of	backward	linkages	to	NRI,	particularly	when	a	country	
has	 a	 revealed	 comparative	 advantage	 in	 agriculture,	 might	 be	 a	 way	 of	 rethinking	
export	diversification	strategies	that	exploit	NRI,	rather	than	bypassing	them.	More	in	
general,	the	NR	curse	might	therefore	be	reversed,	with	adequate	efforts.		
The	 Chapter	 is	 organised	 as	 follows.	 We	 first	 revisit	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 NR	 curse	
debate	that	is	relevant	to	the	purpose	of	this	Chapter	(Section	3.2).	We	then	describe	
the	empirical	strategy	and	the	data	(Section	3.3)	and	present	some	initial	descriptive	
evidence	 in	 support	 of	 our	 main	 conjecture	 (Section	 3.4).	 	 This	 is	 followed	 by	 a	
discussion	of	 the	 econometric	 results	 in	 order	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	NR	 curse	debate	
from	the	perspective	of	structural	change	and	export	diversification	(Section	3.5).	We	














Among	 the	 first	 scholars	 to	question	 the	dominant	 view	of	 their	 time,	 Singer	 (1950)	
and	 Prebisch	 (1959),	 considered	 NR	 as	 an	 “inferior”	 specialisation	 strategy,	 notably	
with	respect	to	manufacturing,	because	of	the	difference	in	income-demand	elasticity	
and	 the	deteriorating	 terms	of	 trade	 in	 natural	 resources.	Demand	 for	 exports	 from	






substantial	 manufacturing	 sector	 (Prebisch	 1959),	 within	 a	 balanced	 development	
strategy	à	la	Nurkse	(1952).	The	argument	was	based	on	the	evidence	that	productivity	
increases	in	the	NRI	would	make	large	parts	of	the	workforce	redundant,	which,	in	the	
absence	 of	 a	 manufacturing	 sector	 absorbing	 this	 labour,	 would	 lead	 to	
unemployment,	particularly	in	developing	countries	(Prebisch	1959).	
The	 scepticism	around	 economic	 development	 ensuing	 from	a	 large	NR	 endowment	
and	 specialisation	 in	 NRI	 became	 a	 dominant	 view	 in	 the	 1980s,	 when	 the	 Dutch	
Disease	thesis	was	first	coined	(Corden	1982;	Auty	1993).	 In	a	nutshell,	based	on	the	




(typically	manufacturing	 sectors)	and	non-tradable	 sectors	 (typically	 services	 sectors)	
for	which	demand	(and/or	 import)	 increases.	The	consequence	 is	a	worsening	of	 the	
balance	 of	 payments	 and	 the	 terms	 of	 trade	 in	 the	 NR	 rich	 country.	 In	 addition,	 a	
contraction	 of	manufacturing	 exports	might	 affect	 “learning	 by	 doing”	 and	 dynamic	
efficiency	at	the	macro	level	(Torvik	2002,	2001).		
Apart	 from	 the	 particular	 argument	 behind	 the	 Dutch	 Disease,	 the	 scholarship	 has	
identified	 a	 range	 of	 negative	 effects	 that	 a	 large	 export-oriented	 natural	 resource	






Indeed,	over	 the	 last	decade	some	scholars	have	challenged	 the	existence	of	 the	NR	
curse,	 by	 reverting	 to	 historical	 examples	 (Wright	 and	 Czelusta	 2004).	 For	 instance,	
some	scholars	have	argued	 that	 the	 resource	curse	would	not	be	 inevitable	 if	 “high-
quality”	 institutions	 were	 in	 place,	 capable	 of	 investing	 and	 distributing	 resource	
revenues	in	a	virtuous	way	(Brunnschweiler	2008;	Boschini	et	al.	2013;	Venables	2016).	
Scholars	have	also	raised	a	range	of	issues	questioning	the	empirical	soundness	of	the	
evidence	 brought	 in	 support	 of	 the	 resource	 curse	 (see	 for	 instance,	 Stijns	 2000;	
Lederman	 and	Maloney	 2006;	 Brunnschweiler	 and	 Bulte	 2008).	 In	 particular,	 it	 has	
been	 argued	 that	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 curse	 thesis,	 as	 in	 the	
seminal	Sachs	and	Warner	(1995),	is	based	on	cross-sectional	data,	which	are	not	fit	to	
capture	 the	evolution	over	 time	of	both	 institutions	and	 technology	 (Robinson	et	 al.	
2006;	 Van	 Der	 Ploeg	 and	 Poelhekke	 2017;	 James	 2015).	 Also,	 natural	 resource	
abundance	 is	often	confused	with	natural	 resource	dependence	 (Brunnschweiler	and	




as	 detrimental	 for	 economic	 development	 is	 that	 it	 has	 often	 been	 regarded	 as	 an	
enclave	 (Heeks	1998),	 extracting	 resources	 from	 the	 country,	with	 few	 linkages	with	
the	 rest	 of	 the	 domestic	 economy	 and	 most	 of	 the	 profits	 being	 shipped	 away	
(Weisskoff	and	Wolff	1977).		
Being	 an	 enclave	 also	 affects	 the	 opportunities	 in	 natural	 resource	 dependent	
countries	 for	 export	 diversification	 (Lederman	 and	 Maloney	 2006).	 In	 this	 respect,	
contributions	have	focused	on	the	chances	of	diversifying	“away”	from	NRI	(	Harding	
and	 Venables	 2016;	 Baldwin	 and	 Venables	 2015).	 Baldwin	 and	 Venables	 (2015),	 for	
instance,	to	model	the	effects	of	trade	policies	aimed	at	increasing	industrialisation	in	
developing	 –	 albeit	 not	 specifically	 NR	 rich	 –	 countries.	 These	 policies,	 they	 argue,	
should	 take	 into	 account	 the	 interactions	 between	 backward	 and	 forward	 linkages	
between	 “part”	 and	 “final”	 goods;	 they	 conclude	 that,	 because	 linkages	 create	 a	
multiplier	 effect,	 targeted	 trade	 and	 industrial	 policies	 that	 make	 sense	 of	 the	





NRI	 to	 spur	 the	 emergence	 of	 other	 sectors	 in	 their	 export	 portfolio,	 reducing	 their	
dependence	 on	NRI.	While	 such	 changes	may	 be	 driven	 by	 a	 variety	 of	 factors,	 it	 is	
worth	noting	that	changes	 in	countries’	export	specialisation	are	tightly	 linked	to	the	
underlying	 domestic	 structure	 (Hausmann	 and	 Klinger	 2006;	Hausmann	 et	 al.	 2007),	
including	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 complex	 products	 and	 services	 (Hidalgo	 and	
Hausmann	2009;	Hidalgo	2009;	 Felipe	et	 al.	 2012).	 Consistent	with	 this	 view,	 export	
diversification	 has	 often	 been	 a	 stated	 policy	 goal	 of	 many	 commodity	 dependent	
countries	(Massol	and	Banal-Estañol	2014).		
However,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 export	 diversification	 may	 be	 hard	 to	 achieve,	




are	 dominated	 by	 large	 foreign	 companies,	 employing	 a	 foreign	 skilled	 workforce,	




However,	 recent	 qualitative	 contributions	 have	 cast	 some	 doubt	 on	 the	 enclave	
hypothesis	 about	NRI	 (Bloch	 and	Owusu	2012;	Adewuyi	 and	Ademola	Oyejide	 2012;	
Marin	and	Stubrin	2015;	Marin	et	al.	2009;	Walker	2001),	putting	forward	a	range	of	
examples	 such	 as	 the	 gold	 mining	 sector	 in	 Ghana	 (Bloch	 and	 Owusu,	 2012)	 and	
positive	 experience	 of	 specialist	 services	 and	 equipment	 for	 mining	 in	 South	 Africa	




The	 debate	 in	 the	 literature	 around	 the	 enclave	 hypothesis	 for	 NRI	 has	 also	 largely	
hinged	upon	the	role	of	forward	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	backward	linkages.		
Taking	 a	 different	 approach,	Hidalgo	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 and	Hausmann	 and	Klinger	 (2006)	
have	 looked	 at	 how	 some	 products	 favour	 the	 emergence	 of	 others	 in	 countries’	
export	 structure,	 finding	 again	 that	NRI	 is	 unlikely	 to	 lead	 to	 the	 emergence	of	 new	
industries.	 Rather	 than	 input-output	 linkages,	 Hausmann	 and	 co-authors	 look	 at	









While	 the	product	space	approach	does	not	 rely	on	backward	or	 forward	 linkages,	 it	
yields	similar	conclusions	to	the	traditional	enclave	view:	within	the	product	space,	NRI	
is	shown	to	be	among	the	 least	connected	goods,	making	 it	 thus	particularly	hard	to	
diversify	starting	from	a	specialisation	in	such	industries.		
Consequently,	 policies	 encouraging	 export	 diversification	 through	 beneficiation,	 i.e.	
fostering	 forward	 linkages	 and	 trying	 to	 move	 from	 NRI	 to	 more	 downstream	
manufacturing	processing	activities,	 are	 considered	 ill	 advised	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	
NRI	is	a	poorly	connected	sector	to	begin	with	and,	second,	export	diversification	is	not	
driven	by	input-output	linkages	but,	rather,	by	similarity	in	capability	requirements.	In	
fact,	 Hausmann	 et	 al.	 (2008)	 argue	 that	 rather	 than	 moving	 vertically,	 industrial	
policies	 should	 focus	 on	 goods	 that	 lie	 closer	 in	 the	 product	 space	 to	 what	 they	
currently	 export.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 join	 a	 quite	 long-standing	 view	 in	 the	 economic	











Linder	 (1961)	 puts	 forward	 this	 thesis	 concerning	 final	 manufactured	 products.	 In	
Lopez-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 we	 have	 explored	 whether	 intermediate	 domestic	
demand	 could	 be	 a	 determinant	 of	 countries’	 GVC	 participation	 in	 KIBS,	 finding	
support	 for	 this	 hypothesis	 concerning	 domestic	 backward	 linkages	 between	 the	
manufacturing	sector	and	KIBS.	
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Here	we	explore	whether	 the	Hirschman-Linder	hypothesis	 could	 apply	 to	backward	

















latter	 are	 natural	 resources	 from	 soil,	 such	 as	 the	 agriculture	 sector.	 They	 are,	 in	
contrast	with	extractive	activities	such	as	mining,	usually	considered	to	be	less	prone	
to	NR	curse	effects	 (Venables	2016),	However,	 they	also	yield	commodities	that	may	
risk	 making	 the	 producing	 country	 highly	 dependent	 on	 them,	 exposed	 to	 price	
volatility	and,	crucially	to	our	analysis,	 less	 likely	to	diversify	due	to	the	 lack	of	 inter-
sectoral	linkages	(Vogel	1994;	Matsuyama	2008;	Hirschman	1958).		







In	 the	remainder	of	 the	thesis	when	we	refer	 to	both	AGR	and	MIN,	we	will	use	the	
general	term	NRI.	When	our	analysis’s	results	only	apply	to	either	sector,	we	will	use	
the	name	of	the	relevant	sector.		




In	 order	 to	 test	 this	 Chapter’s	 main	 hypothesis	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 NRI	 intermediate	
demand	on	export	in	other	sectors,	we	use	the	inter-country	input-output	(ICIO)	tables	
compiled	by	 the	OECD,	 covering	33	 sectors	 in	64	 countries	 for	 the	years	1995-2011.	
ICIO	tables	allow	observing	inter-sectoral	linkages,	tracing	value	added	flows	from	the	
originating	 to	 the	 destination	 sector,	 both	 domestically	 and	 across	 borders10.	
Moreover,	 a	 value	 added	 approach	 allows	 capturing	 each	 sector’s	 domestic	 value	
added	 contribution	 to	 countries’	 exports,	 reallocating	 value	 added	 exported	 to	 the	
sectors	from	which	it	has	originated	(Koopman	et	al.	2010).		
This	way	we	can	assess	the	extent	to	which	the	increase	of	exports	from	a	given	sector	





of	 production	 that	 is	 tradable	 and	 meets	 high	 enough	 quality	 standards	 to	 be	




our	econometric	analysis	at	 the	geo-sector	 level,	 i.e.	 looking	at	each	of	 the	two	KIBS																																																									10	While	 a	 range	 of	 inter-country	 input-output	 databases	 are	 available,	 we	 chose	 the	 ICIO	 from	 the	
OECD	 because	 it	 ensures	 the	 largest	 coverage	 of	 countries,	 while	 still	 being	 based	 on	 statistical	
information	from	countries,	without	using	imputation	methods	(Kowalski	et	al.	2015b).		
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sectors,	 ITS	and	BZS,	 in	each	country.	We	have	thus	a	panel	of	64	countries,	 i.e.	128	
country-sector	 combinations,	which	we	 refer	 to	 as	 geo-sectors	 henceforth,	 over	 the	
1995-2011	period11.	 In	 the	next	 subsection	we	detail	 how	we	use	 the	 ICIO	 tables	 to	
compute	the	outcome	and	main	explanatory	variables.		
3.3.2	Variables		
Our	 literature	review	has	emphasised	the	 importance	for	countries	with	 large	NRI	 to	
diversify	 their	 export	 portfolio,	 which	 means	 putting	 in	 place	 policies	 to	 spur	 the	
exports	of	other	sectors.	Our	main	conjecture	 is	 that	domestic	 intermediate	demand	
stemming	 from	NRI	 could	 achieve	 just	 this;	 this	 would	 imply	 for	 policy	makers	 that	





Our	main	 outcome	 variable	 is	 domestic	 value	 added	 in	 exports	 per	 capita	 from	 the	
KIBS	sector,	which	we	compute	as	follows:	let	VAE	be	a	c*i	x	1	column	vector	with	each	
country	c	and	sector	i	domestic	value	added	embodied	in	gross	export:	





The	 elements	 of	 VAE	 include	 all	 value	 added	 that	 is	 originated	 by	 country	 i	 but	
consumed	 abroad,	 either	 through	 foreign	 final	 demand	 or	 foreign	 intermediate	
demand.	 We	 exclude	 from	 this	 measure	 the	 value	 added	 exported	 as	 foreign	
intermediate	demand	but	then	re-imported	through	country	i’s	own	final	demand.		
																																																								11	 The	 ICIO	 data	 provide	 a	 balanced	 panel.	 However,	 the	World	 Development	 Indicators	 have	 some	
missing	values,	which	makes	the	final	panel	we	are	working	with	unbalanced	and	forces	us	to	drop	some	
countries	 from	 our	 analysis	 altogether,	 such	 as	 Brazil,	 Brunei,	 Vietnam	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 World	
compound.		
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From	 this	VAE	 vector	 we	 select	 the	 elements	 corresponding	 to	 each	 country’s	 KIBS	




exported	 indirectly	 through	 NRI	 exports.	 This	 is	 also	 included	 in	 our	 explanatory	
variable	 that	 captures	 the	 domestic	 demand	 of	 NR	 for	 KIBS.	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 this	
pitfall,	we	exclude	from	our	outcome	variable	the	portion	of	KIBS	value	added	that	is	
exported	 through	 NRI.	 In	 this	 way	 we	 avoid	 any	 mechanical,	 i.e.	 by	 construction,	
linkage	between	our	two	variables	of	interest.	
Our	main	explanatory	variable,	domestic	 intermediate	demand	 for	KIBS	 from	the	NR	
sector,	is	computed	in	a	similar	way,	but	we	take	the	ci	x	ci	matrix	X_DVA	where	each	
entry	 is	 populated	 with	 each	 geo-sector	 value	 added	 contribution	 to	 each	 sector’s	
output:	
𝑋_𝐷𝑉𝐴 = 𝑉′(𝐼 − 𝐴)!!!𝐹 
This	matrix	is	computed	very	much	in	the	same	way	as	VAE	but	we	substitute	the	ci	x	1	
E	vector	with	the	ci	x	ci	matrix	F	populated	with	zeros	off	the	diagonal	and	with	each	
geo-sector	 final	 demand	 on	 the	 diagonal.	 We	 also	 use	 (I-A)d-1,	 which	 is	 the	 usual	










Finally,	 both	 human	 capital	 and	 information	 and	 communication	 technologies	 (ICT)	
infrastructure	have	played	a	significant	role	in	the	expansion	of	the	service	sector	and	
its	linkages	with	the	rest	of	the	economy	(Guerrieri	and	Meliciani	2005).	





To	 test	 our	main	 conjecture	 of	 the	 Hirschman-Linder	 hypothesis	 applied	 to	 NR,	 the	
general	form	of	our	estimated	equation	is	the	following:		
𝑑𝑣𝑎_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑐𝑎𝑝!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑣𝑎_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑐𝑎𝑝!"!! + 𝛽!𝑑𝑑_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑛𝑟_𝑐𝑎𝑝!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑑_𝑘𝑏𝑠_𝑛𝑟_𝑐𝑎𝑝!" ∗ 𝑛𝑟_𝑟𝑐𝑎!"+ 𝛽!𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!" + 𝛽!𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠!" + 𝛼! + 𝛼! + 𝜀!" 
In	our	econometric	equation	presented	above,	dva_kbs_capit	 is	 the	KIBS	value	added	
embodied	 in	 each	 geo-sector’s	 i	 gross	 exports	 per	 capita	 in	 each	 year	 t,	
dd_kbs_nr_capit	 is	 the	per	capita	domestic	 intermediate	demand	provided	by	the	NR	
sector	to	each	geo-sector:	both	these	variables	are	in	log.		
schoolingct	captures	human	capital	 through	years	of	 schooling	 in	each	 country	c	 and	
year	t,	while	 internetaccessct	 is	 Internet	users	per	 thousand	 inhabitants	and	captures	
countries’	 technological	 infrastructure.	We	also	control	 for	geo-sector	and	year	 fixed	
effects	(FE)	αi	and	αt	respectively.	
While	 our	 main	 hypothesis	 concerns	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 intermediate	 domestic	
demand	stemming	from	NRI	on	the	domestic	value	added	exported	by	both	KIBS	and	
high-tech	 manufacturing	 for	 all	 countries,	 we	 expect	 that	 the	 specialisation	 in	 NR	
sectors	 of	 a	 country	 may	 influence	 the	 relationship	 between	 our	 outcome	 and	
explanatory	 variables.	 An	 additional	 hypothesis	 we	 wish	 to	 test	 is,	 in	 fact,	 whether	
countries	 with	 a	 specialisation	 in	 NRI	 experience	 a	 stronger	 relationship	 between	






specialisation	 in	 natural	 resources	 affects	 the	 relationship	 between	 exports	 of	 value	
added	 in	 KIBS	 and	 the	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand	 generated	 by	 the	 natural	
resource	sector.		
Using	the	revealed	comparative	advantage	to	assess	countries’	specialisation	in	NRI	is	
a	 data-driven	 approach.	 This	 has	 the	 advantage	 that	 our	 definition	 of	 specialisation	
does	 not	 rely	 on	 any	 ex-ante	 and	 arbitrary	 definition	 of	 how	 much	 NRI	 should	
represent	of	a	country’s	GDP	or	exports.		
Two	more	issues	need	to	be	dealt	with.	First,	export	of	KIBS	is	likely	to	be	affected	by	
serial	 correlation,	 as	 current	 levels	 of	 exports	 are	 often	 correlated	 with	 past	 ones.	
Second,	 the	 relationship	 between	 exports	 of	 KIBS	 and	 the	 domestic	 intermediate	
demand	 coming	 from	 NR	 is	 likely	 to	 go	 both	 ways;	 while	 we	want	 to	 test	 whether	









DVA	 flows	across	 sectors	 (for	 the	explanatory	variables),	and	 from	one	sector	 to	 the	
rest	 of	 the	 world	 (for	 the	 outcome	 variable).	 This	 is	 to	 account	 for	 countries’	





by	 the	 endowment	 of	 natural	 resources	 that	 need	 not	 be	 tightly	 related	 to	 the	
population	of	a	country.	We	present	in	the	Appendix	a	robustness	check	of	our	results,	
accounting	 for	countries’	size	using	Leontieff	 Inverse	coefficients14.	This	captures	NRI	
intensity	 in	 inputs	 from	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	manufacturing,	 which	 is	 independent	 of	
countries’	size	and	on	countries’	population.		
Before	discussing	our	econometric	results	 in	the	next	section,	we	present	here	some	





that	 larger	 domestic	 intermediate	 demand	 from	 NRI	 has	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 DVA	
export	of	KIBS.		
Figure	 3.1	 plots	 the	 natural	 logs	 of	 DVA	 from	 the	 KIBS	 sector	 and	 the	 logs	 of	
intermediate	 demand	 emanating	 from	 the	NR	 sector	 for	 KIBS.	 The	 dots	 in	 blue	 and	
green	correspond	to	countries	with	and	without	an	RCA	in	NRI,	respectively.	The	same	



























an	 RCA	 in	 AGR,	which	 suggests	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 intermediate	 demand	
from	AGR	and	 the	export	of	KIBS	DVA	may	be	stronger	 for	countries	with	an	RCA	 in	
AGR.		
This	also	brings	 support	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 relative	 size	of	 the	NR	sector	may	be	a	










When	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 MIN	 sector	 in	 Figure	 3.3,	 we	 find	 once	 again	 a	 positive	
association	between	our	variables;	interestingly	we	find	here	that	countries	without	an	
RCA	are	 located	more	 towards	 the	upper-left	quarter	of	 the	graph.	This	hints	at	 the	












This	descriptive	 analysis	 provides	 some	preliminary	evidence	 to	our	main	 conjecture	
on	 the	 positive	 effect	 of	 NRI	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand	 and	 DVA	 exported	 by	
KIBS.		
Relating	back	to	Venables'	(2016)	distinction	between	renewable	(AGR)	and	extractive	
industries	 (MIN),	 we	 find	 some	 interesting	 differences.	 The	 positive	 relationship	 we	
detect	seems	to	be	particularly	strong	for	the	AGR	sector,	rather	than	MIN.	This	may	
suggest	 that	 the	 enclave	 thesis	may	 apply	 to	 backward	 linkages	 from	extractive	NRI	
more	 than	 to	 renewable	 NRI.	 This	 would	 lend	 further	 support	 to	 Venables	 (2016)	
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conclusion	 that	 renewable	 natural	 resources	 may	 have	 fewer	 negative	 effects	 on	
countries’	economic	performance.		
These	figures	offer	prima	facie	evidence	about	the	relationship	between	intermediate	





























































As	mentioned	above,	we	chose	 the	RCA	 index	as	a	measure	of	 specialisation	 in	NRI;	
however,	this	has	some	implications	on	how	these	results	can	be	interpreted.	The	RCA	
is	 a	measure	 of	 relative	 specialisation:	 a	 country	with	 an	RCA	 in	NRI	 above	one	 is	 a	
country	in	which	NRI	represents	a	higher	proportion	in	its	exports	than	it	does	in	the	









of	 the	 sector’s	 productivity.	 This	 has	 bearing	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 our	 results,	
depending	on	the	source	of	RCA	in	NRI:	
- A	very	productive	NR	sector	allows	a	country	to	develop	an	RCA	in	NRI,	hence	
requiring	 more	 and/or	 higher	 quality	 KIBS	 inputs,	 therefore	 increasing	 KIBS	
export	performance;	there	would	thus	be	a	‘quality’	effect	of	the	intermediate	
demand	stemming	from	NRI	on	the	export	performance	of	KIBS;	






of	 the	 intermediate	demand	 to	which	 they	are	exposed,	 countries	 relying	mainly	on	




NRI	 intermediate	 demand,	 regardless	 of	 its	 ‘quality’,	 to	 improve	 KIBS	 export	
performance.	
In	order	 to	ascertain	 this,	we	need	to	control	 for	 the	 ‘quality’	effect	 that	could	drive	
countries’	specialisation	in	NRI.	We	proxy	the	quality	of	the	intermediate	demand	with	






Part	 of	 the	 intermediate	 demand	 of	 the	 NR	 sector	 is	 already	 included	 in	 our	 main	
explanatory	variable;	we	therefore	exclude	this	portion	of	intermediate	demand	from	
the	calculation	of	our	productivity	index.		






























































and	 the	 interaction	 term	 is	 also	 positive	 and	 significant;	 this	 suggests	 that	 such	 a	











In	 conclusion	 it	 would	 appear	 that,	 in	 contrast	 with	 a	 dominant	 view	 of	 natural	
resources	as	an	enclave	sector	with	weak	domestic	inter-sectoral	linkages	with	the	rest	
of	 the	 economy,	 domestic	 intermediate	 demand	 emanating	 from	 NRI	 can	 foster	
exports	for	value	added	in	the	KIBS	sector.		
Our	empirical	results	lend	support	to	our	initial	conjecture	relating	to	the	Hirschman-
Linder	 hypothesis.	 Lopez-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 have	 already	 shown	 that	
manufacturing	 intermediate	demand	could	 foster	GVC	participation	 in	KIBS;	we	now	
find	that	the	same	mechanism	is	also	valid	for	backward	linkages	from	NRI.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 stress,	 however,	 that	 these	 results	 should	 not	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	
rationale	for	developing	a	specialisation	in	NRI,	but	rather	that	countries	that	already	
have	an	economic	structure	 in	which	such	industries	play	a	pivotal	role	should	foster	
the	domestic	backward	 linkages	 to	other	 sectors	 to	 spur	 the	emergence	of	KIBS	and	
achieve	economic	diversification.		
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allow	 countries	 to	 use	 the	 output	 of	 their	 NRI	 as	 input	 for	 low-tech	manufacturing	




Such	 services	 can	 include	 both	 knowledge	 intensive	 activities	 in	 the	 legal	 and	
managerial	domain,	as	well	as	technical	services	and	engineering	activities	both	for	the	
mining	 and	 agricultural	 sector	 (Francois	 and	Woerz,	 2008;	 Kaplan,	 2012;	 Varela	 and	
Hollweg,	2016).	
3.5.2	NRI	and	backward	linked	High-Tech	Manufacturing		
As	emphasised	when	 reviewing	 the	 literature,	most	of	 the	 scholarship	has	 looked	at	
the	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	 originating	 from	 NRI	 to	 downstream	 manufacturing	




KIBS	 exports.	 We	 now	 wish	 to	 test	 whether	 this	 hypothesis	 applies	 to	 high-tech	
manufacturing	 and	 thus	 whether	 backward	 linkages	 can	 constitute	 a	 path	 to	 the	
emergence	 of	 high-tech	 and	 knowledge	 intensive	 sectors,	 both	 in	 services	 and	
manufacturing.		
In	this	section	we	define	high-tech	manufacturing	based	on	the	OECD	classification17,	




In	 Table	 3.3,	we	 again	 find	 positive	 and	 significant	 effects	 of	 domestic	 intermediate	
demand	on	the	export	of	high-tech	manufacturing	value	added,	for	both	AGR	and	MIN.	
In	both	 these	 cases,	 the	 interaction	 terms	are	positive	and	 significant,	 corroborating	












































These	 results	 expand	 the	 existing	 debate	 around	 beneficiation	 and	 NRI	 forward	
linkages	 to	manufacturing,	 suggesting	 that	 backward	 linkages	may	 be	 a	 pathway	 to	
industrialisation	for	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	NRI.		
In	the	previous	section	we	discussed	how	an	RCA	in	NRI	may	arise	because	the	country	
is	 very	 efficient	 in	 the	 production	 process,	 or	 simply	 because	 the	 country	 is	 largely	
endowed	and	lacks	other	sectors	of	comparable	size.		




















































We	 now	 find	 rather	 different	 results.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 high-tech	 manufacturing,	
intermediate	backward	linkages	from	the	AGR	sector	do	not	play	any	significant	role,	
once	we	 control	 for	 the	 productivity	 of	 the	AGR	 sector	 and	 thus	 for	 the	 ‘quality’	 of	








This	 is	 an	 interesting	 result,	 especially	 when	 compared	 to	 the	 different	 results	
obtained	for	KIBS.	Intermediate	demand	from	the	natural	resource	sector	seems	to	be	
a	 successful	 strategy	 to	 develop	 exports	 of	 KIBS,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 we	 look	 at	




NRI-KIBS	 backward	 linkages	 and	 that	 this	 result	 is	 robust,	 even	when	 controlling	 for	
productivity	in	NRI.		Concerning	high-tech	manufacturing	we	only	find	support	for	our	
Hirschman-Linder	 hypothesis	 only	 for	 the	MIN	 sector;	 this	 is	 particularly	 interesting	




This	 Chapter	 puts	 forward	 new	 evidence	 suggesting	 to	 use	 backward,	 rather	 than	
forward,	linkages	to	foster	exports	in	high-tech	manufacturing.	Overall,	we	propose	a	
novel	 and	 alternative	 way	 for	 countries	 with	 large	 NRI	 to	 diversify	 their	 exports	
towards	manufacturing,	relying	on	NRI’s	intermediate	demand	rather	than	output.	We	
find	 this	 path	 to	 be	 viable	 for	 export	 diversification	 towards	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	
manufacturing,	though	for	the	mining	sector	only.		
It	 is	 also	 worth	 pointing	 out	 that	 while	 our	 main	 conjecture	 is	 borne	 out	 by	 the	






This	Chapter	has	offered	novel	empirical	 evidence	 in	 support	of	exploiting	backward	
and	 forward	 linkages	 à	 la	 Hirschman	 (López-Gonzalez	 et	 al.	 2014),	 in	 a	 context	 of	




of	high	 relevance	among	academic	and	policy	makers,	 despite	 it	 not	being	new.	We	
have	 offered	 here	 a	 new	angle	 in	 two	 respects.	 The	 first	 is	 in	 revisiting	 the	 issue	 of	
backward	and	forward	linkage	à	la	Hirschman,	together	with	some	trade	scholars	(see	
for	 instance,	 Venables	 et	 al.	 2015),	 although	 in	 a	 context	 of	 NRI	 specialisation.	 The	
second	 is	 tackling	 the	 age-old	 issue	 of	 diversification	 via	beneficiation	 –	 that	 is,	 the	





We	have	 looked	at	whether	specialisation	 in	NRI	overall,	and	separately	 in	extractive	
industries	 and	 agriculture,	 might	 represent	 a	 sizeable	 and	 quality	 “representative	
domestic	 demand”	 à	 la	 Linder	 that	 can	 spur	 the	 creation	 of	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	
manufacturing	 sectors	 as	 an	 option	 for	 export	 specialisation.	 We	 explore	 whether	
there	is	a	causal	 link	between	NRI	specialisation	and	export	performance	of	KIBS	and	
high-tech	manufacturing.	We	find	robust	evidence	in	support	of	our	conjectures.		




In	 the	 case	 of	 high-tech	manufacturing,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 positive	 impact	 on	 export	
performance	of	manufacturing	of	the	intermediate	demand	of	NRI	is	absorbed	by	the	





narrative	 around	 NRI,	 and	 surely	 one	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 around	
‘premature	deindustrialisation’	recently	put	forward	(Rodrik,	2015).		
While	 we	 do	 not	 explicitly	 provide	 grounded	 evidence	 for	 specific	 industrial	 policy	
tools,	 we	 hope	 to	 provide	 a	 background	 narrative	 that	 supports	 new	 directions	 of	
these.	More	 in	 general,	 it	 is	 not	 straightforward	 to	 identify	 appropriate	 policy	 tools	
that	 support	 domestic	 and	 trade	 diversification	 in	 emerging	 countries,	 that	 allow	
‘quality’	 industrialisation	 or	 indeed	 ‘quality’	 servification,	 all	 the	 more	 so	 when	
countries	start	from	a	specialisation	in	NR.		
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be	 on	 the	 technological	 frontier	 but	 nevertheless	 represent	 feasible	 directions	 for	






international	 technology	 transfer,	 via,	 for	 instance,	Multinational	 Enterprises	 (MNEs)	
presence,	 most	 especially	 in	 NR-based	 countries.	 The	 development	 of	 domestic	
capabilities	for	upgrading	is	the	result	of	a	patient	and	long-term	process	of	interaction	
of	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 firms,	 all	 the	 more	 so	 in	 a	 context	 of	 international	
fragmentation	of	production.	Currently	 there	 is	 little	 reflection,	and	only	 from	a	 few	
scholars,	on	the	link	between	international	technology	transfer,	export	diversification,	
and	 domestic	 technology	 upgrading	 as	 an	 explicit	 policy	 goal	 that	 aims	 to	 ensure	
quality	directions	to	structural	transformation	(Bell	2009;	Barrientos	et	al.	2011;	Fu	et	
al.	2011;	Pietrobelli	et	al.	2011).	The	conjecture	and	empirical	evidence	put	forward	in	









This	 Chapter	 investigates	 the	 association	 between	 buyer-supplier	 international	 trade	
relationships	 and	 supplier’s	 product	 upgrading.	 We	 proxy	 the	 suppliers’	 upgrading	 with	 a	
measure	 of	 product	 sophistication.	 We	 first	 propose	 a	 measure	 of	 power	 in	 the	 trade	
relationship,	combining	the	dependence	of	each	firm	on	the	trading	partner	and	their	market	








different	destination	countries,	 finding	 in	particular	that	buyers	dominating	the	market	 in	the	
US	tend	to	import	low-sophistication	products	and	make	it	harder	for	suppliers	to	upgrade.		
We	contribute	to	the	recent	 literature	on	buyer-supplier	 relationships	by	explicitly	 including	a	
measure	 of	 power	 into	 our	 analysis.	 In	 doing	 this,	 we	 also	 offer	 further	 support	 and	





The	 positive	 association	 between	 export	 and	 growth	 is	 an	 established	 empirical	
regularity	 (Pack	 and	 Saggi	 2001;	 Baldwin	 and	 Yan	 2014;	 Lee	 2011;	 Iacovone	 and	
Javorcik	 2010;	 Iacovone	 and	 Javorcik	 2009).	More	 recently,	 it	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	
that	 it	 is	 not	 just	 the	 quantity	 but	 also	 the	 quality	 and	 sophistication	 of	 what	 one	
exports	that	affects	growth	prospects	(Hausmann	et	al.	2007;	Poncet	and	Starosta	de	
Waldemar	2013;	Jarreau	and	Poncet	2012).	 Increases	 in	the	sophistication	of	exports	
often	 means	 trading	 in	 more	 value-added	 products,	 increasing	 the	 stock	 of	 human	
capital	 and	 capabilities	 in	 the	 country,	 which	 can,	 in	 turn,	 foster	 economic	
development	(Lall	et	al.	2006;	Hidalgo	et	al.	2007;	Minondo	2010;	Zhu	and	Fu	2013).	
Consistent	with	this	view,	the	literature	has	put	forward	evidence	of	the	importance	of	





Yang	 (2009)	 review	 the	 evidence	 and	 conclude	 that	 exports	 have	 larger	 positive	
impacts	 on	 firms	 in	 developing	 countries,	 especially	 during	 their	 first	 years	 of	
exporting;	this	makes	Colombia	a	relevant	country	to	study.		
Trade	has	both	 increased	and	changed	 in	nature	 in	 recent	decades,	 shifting	 towards	
trade	in	intermediates	and	leading	to	the	emergence	of	global	value	chains	(GVCs).	
From	 a	 development	 perspective,	 GVCs	 have	 often	 been	 regarded	 as	 a	 new	
opportunity	 for	 firms	 in	 developing	 countries	 to	 access	 the	 global	 market,	 tap	 into	
foreign	 knowledge	 and	 know-how	 and,	 ultimately,	 achieve	 upgrading	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	
2005;	Kaplinsky	2004;	Baldwin	2011).	
Upgrading	via	trade	can	happen	through	the	exchange	of	knowledge	between	buyers	
and	 suppliers,	 such	 as	 product	 specifications	 (Pietrobelli	 and	 Saliola	 2008),	 and	
cooperation	 through	 tight	 relationships	 between	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	 supplier,	 going	
well	beyond	pure	market	 relationships	 (Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Giuliani	et	al.	2005b).	An	
implication	of	 this	 is	 that	 flows	of	knowledge	are	not	automatic	and	depend	on	how	
much	the	buyer	relies	on	their	supplier,	how	skilled	the	supplier	 is,	and	what	kind	of	




therefore,	 upgrading	 through	 participation	 in	 GVCs	 ultimately	 depends	 on	 the	
governance	 under	which	 firms	 operate	within	 a	 GVC:	 power	 relationships	 along	 the	
chain	shape	firms’	governance	and,	thus,	upgrading	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Humphrey	and	
Schmitz	2002;	Pietrobelli	and	Saliola	2008).		
In	 parallel,	 albeit	 separately,	 with	 this	 debate,	 a	 growing	 literature	 has	 emerged	 in	
recent	 years	 using	 quantitative	 data	 on	 firm	 level	 transactions	 to	 explore	 firm	
heterogeneity	in	trade	(Melitz	2003;	Bernard	et	al.	2014;	Carballo	et	al.	2013;	Bernard	
et	 al.	 2011;	 Eaton	 et	 al.	 2007)	 and	 buyer-supplier	 matching	 (Sugita	 et	 al.	 2015;	
Dragusanu	2014).	Stemming	from	this,	a	stream	of	research	has	been	using	matched	
buyer-supplier	data	at	the	transaction	level	to	explore	the	importance	of	relationships	
(which	 this	 literature	 also	 refers	 to	 as	 “value	 of	 the	 relationship”),	 between	 trading	
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parties,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 low	 contract-enforceability	 (Macchiavello	 2010;	
Macchiavello	 and	Morjaria	 2015;	Macchiavello	 and	Morjaria	 2016;	Macchiavello	 and	
Miquel-Florensa	2017).	
The	key	finding	of	this	literature	is	that	as	buyers	and	suppliers	trade	with	each	other	
over	 time,	 they	 also	 learn	 about	 and	 trust	 each	 other	 more;	 this	 is	 particularly	
important	 in	 context	 with	 low	 contract	 enforceability.	 Reputation	 in	 such	 a	 context	
becomes	 crucial	 and	 its	 value	 increases	 with	 the	 age	 of	 the	 relationship,	 reducing	
opportunistic	behaviour	in	trade	relationships.		
Despite	 this	 growing	 evidence	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 relationships,	 this	 stream	 of	
literature	 has	 not	 directly	 tackled	 the	 issue	 of	 upgrading	 or	 power	 within	 buyer-
supplier	relationships.		
This	 Chapter	 aims	 to	 remedy	 this	 with	 a	 quantitative	 approach;	 we	 answer	 the	
question	of	whether	power	 in	buyer-supplier	 relationships	 is	 a	 predictor	 of	 levels	 of	
export	 sophistication,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 introducing	 new	 products,	 and	 that	 of	
increasing	sophistication.		
We	 operationalise	 the	 concept	 of	 power,	 in	 particular	 distinguishing	 between	 the	
dependence	 of	 each	 trading	 party	 on	 each	 other	 and	 each	 trading	 party’s	 market	
share.	 We	 investigate	 whether	 these	 two	 different	 understandings	 of	 power	 are	
related	 in	different	ways	 to	export	 sophistication	and	upgrading,	 as	well	 as	whether	
such	relationships	change	across	destination	countries.		
Our	main	 source	 of	 data	 is	 the	 Colombian	 Customs,	 with	 information	 on	 all	 export	
transactions	 between	 2008	 and	 2014.	We	merge	 this	 with	 data	 both	 on	 exporters’	
financial	 statements	 and	 product	 measures	 of	 complexity	 from	 the	 Atlas	 of	
Complexity18,	compiled	by	Harvard	University.		
In	 our	 analysis	 we	 provide	 some	 descriptive	 evidence	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
power	within	buyer-supplier	pairs	and	the	sophistication	of	the	products	traded.	This	is																																																									18	The	terms	‘complexity’	and	‘sophisticated’	can	be	used	interchangeably.	For	clarity	’s	sake,	however,	






Therefore,	our	 level	of	analysis	 is	 the	pair,	 for	which	we	observe	both	the	buyer	and	




We	 find	 that	 when	 a	 supplier	 trades	 with	 a	 powerful	 buyer,	 both	 the	 level	 of	
sophistication	and	the	chances	of	upgrading	will	vary	depending	on	the	source	of	the	






This	 relationship	 is	 reversed	 when	 we	 look	 at	 relationships	 between	 Colombian	
exporters	and	US	importers,	which	suggests	that	firms	exporting	to	buyers	dominating	
the	market	in	high-income	countries	may	find	it	harder	to	both	trade	in	sophisticated	
products	 and	 improve	 their	 export	 sophistication.	 This	 is	 interesting	 because	 it	
suggests	 that	 destination	 countries,	 and	 knowledge	 asymmetries	 among	 these,	may	









into	 our	 analysis,	 which	 the	 established	 literature	 on	 GVCs	 has	 put	 forward	 as	 a	
determinant	of	upgrading	and,	ultimately,	economic	development.	







then	 turn	 to	 the	data	 and	 the	 construction	of	 the	 variables	 and	describe	Colombian	





This	 section	 starts	 by	 reviewing	 the	 literature	 on	 GVCs,	 emphasising	 the	 theoretical	
and	 empirical	 contributions	 on	power	 in	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 and	upgrading.	
We	 integrate	 these	 concepts	 into	 the	 analysis	 of	 transaction	 level	 trade	data,	which	
has	only	recently	started	to	explore	the	importance	of	buyer-supplier	relationships.	In	
order	to	include	power	into	this	growing	strand	of	work,	we	draw	on	the	measurement	
of	 this	 provided	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 industrial	 organisation	 and	 supply	 chain	
management.	
4.2.1:	Global	value	chains:	power	and	upgrading	
The	 international	 fragmentation	 of	 production	 has	 raised	 attention	 on	 the	
relationships	 among	 firms	 across	 borders,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 local	 suppliers	
(often	 in	 developing	 countries)	 can	 learn	 from	 global	 suppliers	 (Gereffi	 1994;	
Humphrey	and	Schmitz	2002).	
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The	 GVC	 framework	 views	 this	 learning	 process	 as	 tightly	 linked	 to	 innovation	 and	
firms’	 access	 to	 new	 technology.	Within	 this,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 power	 within	 buyer-
supplier	relationships	affects	the	availability	of	knowledge	to	suppliers.		
One	 of	 the	main	 contentions	 of	 this	 literature	 is	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	 buyers	 and	 suppliers	 can	 influence	 suppliers’	 scope	 for	 progressing	 in	 the	
value	chain.	Within	this	framework,	scholars	refer	to	the	nature	of	the	relationship	as	




holds	 a	 considerably	 larger	 amount	 of	 power	 over	 the	 others,	 and	 (iii)	 hierarchical	
value	chains	characterised	by	direct	ownership.		
Building	on	this,	Gereffi	et	al.	(2005)	propose	a	further	refined	taxonomy	identifying:		
- Arm’s	 length	 market	 relationships,	 with	 little	 level	 of	 commitment	 and	 low	
switching	costs;		
- Modular	 value	 chains	 in	 which	 the	 supplier	 takes	 care	 of	 all	 the	 process	
technology	 and	 delivers	 a	 turnkey	 product.	 However,	 it	 does	 so	with	 generic	
machinery	and	low	levels	of	transaction-specific	investment;		
- Relational	 value	 chains	 are	 within	 sophisticated	 relationships	 between	 buyer	
and	 supplier	 and	 high	 level	 of	mutual	 dependence,	 usually	 relying	 on	 spatial	
proximity	of	trust	that	is	built	up	over	time;		
- Captive	 value	 chains	 in	which	 small	 suppliers	 are	dependent	on	 large	buyers,	
with	a	degree	of	control	and	monitoring	on	the	buyer’s	part;		
- Hierarchical	 value	 chains,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 direct	 ownership	 link	 between	
headquarters	and	subsidiaries.		
This	 categorisation	of	 different	 kinds	of	 governance	 and	buyer-supplier	 relationships	
lends	 itself	 very	well	 to	 qualitative	 studies;	 however,	 it	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 clear-cut	
definition	of	the	concept	of	power	or	a	measurement	that	would	ensure	comparability	
across	cases.	We	 later	discuss	contributions	 from	other	strands	of	 literature	that	put	





definition,	 upgrading	 refers	 to	 the	 improvement	 of	 firms’	 performance,	 through	




to	 product	 and	 process	 innovation,	 and	 correspond	 to	 a	 supplier	 introducing	 a	 new	
product	 or	 a	 new	production	process,	 respectively.	Function	 upgrading	 refers	 to	 the	
inclusion	of	new,	higher-value	added	activities	within	 the	GVC	of	which	a	 supplier	 is	




concept	 of	 upgrading	 is	 still	 very	 broad:	 it	 is	 particularly	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 from	
innovation	 and	 whether	 the	 two	 co-occur	 or	 one	 is	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	 other	
(Morrison	et	al.	2006).	As	a	consequence	upgrading	has	often	been	operationalised	in	
many	different	ways	across	the	literature	(Morrison	et	al.	2006).	
The	 fuzziness	 around	 the	 definition	 of	 these	 concepts	 represents	 a	 considerable	
obstacle	 to	 providing	 evidence	 based	 on	 large	 quantitative	 samples,	 which	 would	
favour	the	generalisation	of	the	insights	from	the	GVC	literature.	
The	 literature	 has	 tried	 to	 overcome	 this	 problem	 by	 constructing	 measures	 of	
sophistication,	 or	 complexity,	 which	 we	 use	 henceforth	 interchangeably.	 Focusing	




by	qualifying	the	new	varieties	 included	in	the	export	portfolio,	positing	that	 it	 is	not	
only	 about	 including	more	 products	 in	 the	 export	 portfolio,	 but	 also	 including	more	




export	 sophistication	 by	 inferring	 the	 sophistication	 of	 a	 product	 from	 the	
characteristics	of	the	country	exporting	it,	mainly	its	average	income,	rather	than	the	
product’s	characteristics.	Building	on	 this	approach,	 the	most	 remarkable	attempt	 to	
compute	a	measure	of	sophistication	is	arguably	in	the	contribution	from	Hidalgo	et	al.	
(2007),	who	propose	a	data-driven	approach	to	capabilities.	This	is	further	developed	
in	 Hidalgo	 and	 Hausmann	 (2009),	 where	 they	 detach	 the	measure	 of	 sophistication	
from	income	per	capita	–	as	was	case	 in	Lall	et	al.	 (2006)	and	Hidalgo	et	al.	 (2007)	–	
rather	relying	on	a	product’s	ubiquity	and	the	exporter’s	diversification.		
The	most	sophisticated	products	are	those	that	are	being	exported	by	few	and	highly	
diversified	 countries.	 The	 intuition	 behind	 this	 is	 that	 sophistication	 can	 be	 inferred	
through	 a	 product’s	 ubiquity	 and	 countries’	 diversification.	 The	 most	 sophisticated	




In	 this	 approach,	 therefore,	 countries’	 and	 products’	 complexity	 define	 each	 other	
through	measures	of	diversification	and	ubiquity,	respectively.		
Hidalgo	 and	 co-authors	 resort	 therefore	 to	 algorithms	 based	 on	 the	 method	 of	
reflection,	 to	 compute	 a	 complexity	 measure	 for	 both	 products	 (based	 on	 their	
ubiquity	 and	 the	 diversification	 of	 the	 economies	 exporting	 them)	 and	 economies	
(based	on	the	diversification	of	their	export	portfolio	and	the	ubiquity	of	the	products	
they	export).		
This	measure	of	 complexity	has	been	used	 in	 the	 literature	at	mainly	 the	country	or	
municipality	 level	 (Bustos	 et	 al.	 2012;	 Poncet	 and	 Starosta	 de	 Waldemar	 2013).	
However,	 the	 complexity	 index	 refers	 to	 products	 and	 can	 also	 be	 applied	 to	micro	
level	data	to	study	changes	in	exporters’	portfolio	to	capture	upgrading.	
This	 would	 allow	 carrying	 out	 quantitative	 analysis	 at	 the	 firm	 level,	 proxying	
upgrading	 through	 complexity	 measures	 and	 studying	 its	 relationship	 with	 buyer-
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supplier	 relationships’	 characteristics.	 It	 would	 thus	 be	 possible	 to	 test	 the	 insights	
from	the	GVC	 literature	reviewed	 in	this	section	 in	a	quantitative	setting,	concerning	
the	 importance	 of	 power	 in	 buyer-supplier’s	 relationships	 as	 a	 determinant	 of	
upgrading.		
To	do	this,	 it	 is	 important	to	first	review	the	contributions	of	the	recent	 literature	to	
firms’	heterogeneity	and	exports,	using	micro	level	data,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	
recent	 work	 that	 has	 recognised	 the	 importance	 of	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	
(Macchiavello	and	Morjaria	2015).		
4.2.2	Exploring	the	value	of	buyer-supplier	relationships	with	micro	data.	
The	 literature	 on	 trade	 at	 the	 firm	 level	 starts	 from	 rather	 different	 theoretical	
premises	from	the	GVC	literature.	In	fact,	it	initially	focused	on	trade	models	of	firms’	






However,	 a	 subset	 of	 this	 literature	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 long-lasting	
relationships,	 which	 is	 related	 to	 ideas	 of	 trust	 and,	 crucially	 to	 our	 purpose	 here,	
acknowledges	 that	 relationships	 can	 be	 of	 a	 different	 nature.	 We	 revisit	 these	
contributions	 here	 and	 emphasise	 the	 overlap	 with	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 GVC	 literature	
discussed	in	the	previous	section.			
A	first	major	contribution	from	this	literature	concerns	the	importance	for	buyers	and	
suppliers	 to	 acquire	 information	 about	 each	 other.	 Evidence	 has	 shown	 that	 firms	
trading	in	differentiated	products	tend	to	switch	suppliers	more	often,	either	because	
they	are	more	likely	to	find	more	competitive	suppliers	or	because	the	supplier	fails	to	








2010).	Moreover,	while	 long-lasting	 relationships	 are	 a	 small	 proportion	of	 the	 total	




Morjaria	2015).	 Further	 support	 for	 this	 is	 also	offered	by	Macchiavello	 and	Miquel-
Florensa	(2017)	who	study	the	 likelihood	of	exporters	selling	outside	the	relationship	
and	how	trading	partners	need	assurances	concerning	the	persistence	of	both	demand	
and	 supply	 in	 a	 low	 contract-enforceability	 context.	 They	 find	 that	 long	 term	
relationships	provide	such	assurances,	although	not	as	much	as	vertical	integration.	
There	 is	an	 increasing	body	of	evidence	on	buyer-supplier	 relationships	and	how	the	
trust	 within	 these	 is	 relevant	 to	 trade	 flows	 and	 patterns.	 These	 show	 that	 not	 all	
buyer-supplier	 relationships	 are	 the	 same	 and	 that	 their	 importance,	 which	 many	
contributions	in	this	strand	of	work	refer	to	as	value	(Monarch	and	Schmidt-Eisenlohr	
2015;	Macchiavello	and	Morjaria	2015),	increases	over	time.		
As	mentioned	 in	 the	previous	 section,	 the	 literature	on	GVCs	also	posits	 that	not	all	
trade	relationships	are	the	same	and	that	trust	and	mutual	knowledge	build	over	time:	
it	 emphasises	 the	 importance	 of	 power	 asymmetries	 within	 buyer-supplier	
relationships.		
Despite	the	proximity	in	both	topics	and	concepts,	there	is	still	very	little	quantitative	
evidence	 looking	 explicitly	 at	 GVCs	 at	 the	 transaction	 level,	 with	 few	 exceptions	
looking	at	global	supply	chains	and	production	networks.		









This	 literature	 has	mainly	 looked	 at	 determinants	 of	 the	matching	 process	 between	





of	 improving	 their	 trade	 performance	 and	 upgrade.	 In	 contrast,	 relational	 GVC	
relationships	are	also	long-lasting	but	usually	entail	more	balanced	power	relationships	
and	 involvement	 of	 suppliers	 in	 the	 production	 process.	 This	 would	 be	 through	
frequent	 interactions	and	knowledge	exchange,	 therefore	favouring	upgrading	of	 the	
supplier	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005;	Humphrey	and	Schmitz	2002).	






the	 sources	 of	 power.	 These	 have	 to	 do	 with	 features	 of	 the	 market	 in	 which	 the	
buyer-supplier	 relationship	 takes	place,	as	well	as	with	specific	aspects	of	 the	buyer-




at	 prices	 above	 their	 marginal	 cost	 and	 obtain	 profits	 through	 a	 mark-up.	 Market	







of	 power;	 in	 particular,	market	 concentration	 and	 firms’	 shares	 in	 a	 given	 sector	 or	
industry	are	considered	tell-tale	signs	of	market	power.	This	view	on	market	power	is	
more	concerned	with	firms’	ability	to	charge	prices	above	the	marginal	cost.	This	has	
however	bearing	on	 firms’	ability	 to	engage	 in	upgrading	 too,	 since	 firms	benefitting	
market	 power	 will	 be	 have	 a	 larger	 amount	 of	 resources	 to	 invest	 in	 product	
development	and	upgrading.	Moreover,	as	firms	in	concentrated	industries	are	able	to	









define	market	 structure’s	 power	 as	 a	 firm’s	market	 or	 bargaining	 power	 in	 product-
market	 or	 industry.	 Henceforth,	We	 refer	 to	 this	 as	 the	 “market	 aspect”	 of	 power.	
Inter-firms’	 market	 power	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 firm’s	 power	 within	 the	 inter-firm	
relationships	 or	 a	 specialised	 network	 of	 firms.	 Henceforth,	 we	 refer	 to	 this	 as	 the	
“relational	aspect”	of	power.	
4.2.3.b:	Quantitative	approaches	to	buyer-supplier	relationships	and	power	


















Italian	 exporters	 were	 engaged	 in	 long-term	 relationships	 with	 their	 buyers,	 and	
whether	they	were	involved	in	the	designing	of	the	products	they	were	exporting.		
Brancati	et	al.	(2017)	rely	on	this	information	to	investigate	different	GVC	governances	
and	 the	 impact	 on	 suppliers’	 performance.	 They	 argue	 that	 firms	 involved	 in	 long-
lasting	relationships,	and	in	the	design	of	products,	are	operating	under	what	Gereffi	
et	 al.	 (2005)	 refer	 to	 as	 “relational”	 governance.	 They	 find	 that	 such	 firms	are	more	
likely	 to	 carry	 out	 innovative	 activities	 and	 prove	 to	 be	 more	 resilient	 to	 the	 2008	
financial	crisis.		
Using	 the	 same	 source	of	 data,	Giovannetti	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 explore	 the	 effect	 of	 being	
part	 of	 a	 value	 chain,	which	 they	 define	 as	 “participation	 in	 a	 specific	 supply	 chain,	
implying	a	continuative	contribution	of	the	firm	to	specific	productions,	provided	that	
this	 activity	 constitutes	 the	majority	 of	 the	 firm’s	 turnover’’(Giovannetti	 et	 al.	 2015,	
p.848).	 They	 find	 that	 firms	 integrated	 in	a	 supply	 chain	are	also	more	 likely	 to	gain	
access	to	international	markets,	and	joining	GVCs.		
These	 recent	 studies	 rely	 on	 specific	 questions	 from	 a	 specific	 survey,	 which	 allows	
















(2008),	 for	 example,	 rely	 on	 survey	 data	 compiled	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 providing	
quantitative	data	on	the	market	structure	in	which	a	sample	of	Chinese	SMEs	operate.	
The	 focus	 of	 their	 study	 is	 around	 the	 lack	 of	 market	 power	 for	 suppliers	 and,	
accordingly,	 they	 construct	 a	 set	 of	 dummy	 variables	 to	 study	 the	 (weak)	 market	
power	of	the	supplier.	It	is	also	noteworthy	that	while	these	dummies	are	constructed	
based	 on	 a	 survey,	 they	 can	 also	 be	 computed	 with	 transaction	 data,	 providing	
information	 on	 sales	 between	 each	 buyer	 and	 supplier.	 Moreover,	 they	 include	
information	 on	 both	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 supplier	 vis-à-vis	 the	 buyer	 and	 the	
structure	 of	 the	 market,	 proxying	 the	 concentration	 with	 market	 shares	 of	 the	
supplier.		
Emphasising	 the	 importance	of	market	 structure,	 research	on	 industrial	 organisation	
has	also	put	forward	a	range	of	measures;	the	most	widely	known	measure	is	probably	
the	 Herfindahl-Hirschman	 index	 (HHI)	 in	 computing,	 consisting	 of	 the	 sum	 of	 the	
squares	of	the	market	shares	of	each	firm	in	a	given	sector.		
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Alternatively,	 the	 Lerner	 index	 is	 based	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 sale	 price	 and	
marginal	 cost,	 rather	 than	 the	 concentration	 of	 the	market	 structure:	 it	 consists	 of	
taking	the	difference	between	the	price	and	marginal	cost	divided	by	the	price.	Datta	
et	al.	(2013)	use	this	index	to	explore	the	relationship	between	market	concentration	





Profit	 Impact	 of	 Market	 Strategies	 (PIMS)	 dataset	 and	 computes	 the	 HHI	 for	 the	
suppliers	 as	well	 as,	 interestingly,	 the	 relative	 size	 of	 the	 supplier,	 i.e.	 the	 supplier’s	
market	 share	 divided	 by	 its	 largest	 competitor’s	market	 share.	 He	 also	 looks	 at	 the	
buyer	 concentration,	 i.e.	 the	 number	 of	 buyers	 taking	 in	 a	 total	 50%	 of	 the	 seller’s	
revenue.		




The	 dyadic	 and	 relational	 aspect	 of	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 is	 a	 relatively	 well-
established	 fact	 in	 the	 literature	on	 supply	 chain	management,	where	 information	 is	
usually	gathered	concerning	both	parties	 involved	in	the	relationship	(Liu	et	al.	2010;	
Nyaga	et	 al.	 2013).	 This	 can	be	 captured	by	 looking	 at	 the	 share	 that	 the	purchases	
(sales)	of	the	buyer	(supplier)	represent	in	the	sales	(purchases)	of	the	supplier	(buyer).	
A	 potential	 drawback	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 dependence	 may	 include	 more	 than	
simply	sale	shares	measured	in	trade	volume:	a	supplier	may	depend	on	their	buyer’s	
knowledge	 or	 other	 assets.	 However,	 transaction	 level	 data	 do	 not	 typically	 include	
such	 information	 for	 both	 trade	 parties,	 which	 makes	 it	 hard	 to	 circumvent	 this	
obstacle.	A	second	limitation	of	only	looking	at	the	relational	aspect	of	power	is	that	it	
does	not	 take	 into	account	each	 firms’	position	within	their	market;	some	firms	may	
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firms’	 total	 trade.	 Market	 share	 will	 not,	 however,	 capture	 all	 factors	 underlying	








This	 Chapter’s	 overarching	 goal	 is	 to	 study	 the	 relationship	 between	 power	 and	
upgrading	in	buyer-supplier	relationships.	The	scholarship	has	mainly	studied	this	with	
a	 GVC	 approach	 largely	 based	 on	 case	 studies;	 this	 has	 led	 to	 the	 view	 that	 power	
shapes	 different	 kinds	 of	 governance	 that,	 in	 turn,	 shape	 suppliers’	 possibilities	 to	
upgrade	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005;	 Humphrey	 and	 Schimitz	 2002;	 Giuliani	 et	 al.	 2005a;	
Morrison	et	al.	2006).		
There	 remains,	however,	 some	ambiguity	around	 the	concept	of	upgrading,	which	 is	
particularly	 hard	 to	 disentangle	 from	 innovation	 and	 generally	 lacks	 an	 agreed	
definition	 in	 the	 scholarship.	 Recent	 contributions	 have	 put	 forward	 the	measure	 of	




burgeoning	 literature	 has	 been	 studying	 trade	 at	 the	 firm	 level,	 focusing	 on	 how	




However,	 trade	 relationships	may	 have	 similar	 duration	 and	 levels	 of	 trust	 but	 very	
different	 power	 dynamics,	 leading	 also	 to	 different	 outcomes	 in	 terms	 of	 trade	
performance	 and	 export	 upgrading.	 So	 far,	 this	 has	 not	 been	 acknowledged	 by	 the	
scholarship	 studying	 firm	 heterogeneity	 in	 trade	 and	 the	 buyer-supplier	 matching	
process.	
By	 testing	 hypotheses	 from	 the	 GVC	 literature	with	 buyer-supplier	 transaction	 level	
data	we	wish	to	bridge	these	two	strands	of	work,	to	include	power	and	upgrading	in	
the	 quantitative	 literature	 on	 buyer-supplier	 relationships.	We	 also	 aim	 to	 take	 into	




In	order	 to	shed	 light	on	 these	questions	 it	 is	crucial	 to	devise	a	way	of	proxying	 for	
power	in	the	context	of	buyer-supplier	relationships.	The	literature	has	often	studied	










analysis.	We	 unpack	 whether	 the	 buyer’s	 (or	 supplier’s)	 power	 comes	 from	market	
issues	that	have	to	do	with	the	concentration	of	the	market,	or	from	relational	aspects	
that	are	specific	to	the	buyer-supplier	relationship.		
In	 the	 next	 section	 we	 detail	 how	 we	 use	 computed	measures	 of	 dependence	 and	
market	shares	to	capture	the	relational	and	market	aspects	of	power,	respectively.	
We	combine	 these	measures	with	 the	 complexity	measure	 to	empirically	 investigate	
the	relationship	between	the	two	aspects	of	power	and,	(i)	the	level	of	sophistication	
of	 exports,	 (ii)	 the	 likelihood	 of	 introducing	 new	 products,	 and	 (iii)	 the	 likelihood	 of	
increasing	export	sophistication,	which	we	use	to	identify	upgrading.		


















aggregate	products	 to	 4-digit	 level	 industries	 based	on	 the	 1992	HS,	 to	match	 them	
with	the	data	on	complexity	from	DATLAS.		
Our	 data	 also	 provide	 information	 on	 the	 quantity	 of	 products	 traded	 in	 each	
transaction,	in	units,	gross	and	net	weight	as	well	as	value	in	Colombian	pesos	(COP).	
We	retrieved	deflators	for	the	export	sector21	from	the	Colombian	National	Bureau	of	
Statistics	 (DANE),	 which	 we	 use	 to	 make	 product	 values	 comparable	 across	 years,	
taking	2009	as	the	reference	year.	
SIREM	data	are	made	publicly	available	by	SIREM	and	provide	useful	 information	on	
firms’	 characteristics,	 which	 we	 use	 to	 compute	 productivity;	 these	 can	 be	 readily	
matched	with	the	NIT	in	the	DIAN	data.		
It	 is	 important	 to	 stress	 that	 our	 data	 cover	 all	 transactions	 between	 firms	 (direct	
purchases	from	individuals	abroad	have	been	excluded	from	our	analysis)	and	do	not	
allow	clear	distinction	between	 trade	 tout	 court	 and	 trade	 in	GVCs.	The	 literature	at	




The	 ideal	 approach	 would	 consist	 in	 measuring	 firms’	 value	 added	 content	 in	 their	
exports,	but	the	DIAN	data	(nor,	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	any	other	data	source)	
do	 not	 provide	 such	 information.	 However	 they	 do	 allow	 observing	 the	 interactions	











upgrading,	 highlighting	 the	 interesting	 approach	 taken	 by	 Hidalgo	 and	 Hausmann	
(2009).	 The	 Harvard	 University’s	 Centre	 for	 International	 Development	 (CID)	 has	
compiled	 the	DATLAS	dataset	 for	 Colombia,	with	 complexity	 indexes	 for	 products	 at	
the	4-digit	level	of	disaggregation,	from	2008	to	2014.	
This	 index	 relies	 on	 goods’	 ubiquity	 and	 countries’	 export	 diversification.	 As	 a	
consequence	 it	 is	 computed	 separately	 each	 year	 and	 changes	 could	 be	 driven	 by	
changes	in	other	countries’	export	portfolio.	However,	it	seems	reasonable	to	consider	
the	complexity	of	a	product	as	a	 time	 invariant	characteristic;	we	 therefore	 take	 the	
average	across	years	for	each	product.	This	is	important	because	we	wish	to	use	these	
data	as	a	proxy	for	upgrading,	which	also	happens	over	time;	therefore	it	is	crucial	that	
changes	 in	 complexity	measure	are	driven	by	changes	 in	 the	product	mix	 in	which	a	






buyer-supplier	 pairs	 and	 to	 buyer-supplier-product	 combinations.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	
clarity,	in	the	remainder	of	our	discussion	we	identify	a	relationship	as	a	pair	of	buyer	
and	 supplier,	 trading	 in	 a	 given	 destination	 country,	 in	 a	 given	 year	 and	 a	 given	
product.	In	the	remainder	of	the	thesis	we	will	refer	to	buyer-supplier	pairs	(or	simply	
pairs)	as	buyer-supplier	matches,	i.e.	including	all	the	products	they	exchange.	To	give	
an	example,	 two	 firms	 trading	 three	products	 in	a	given	year	would	constitute	 three	
relationships	but	only	one	pair.		
After	matching	year	by	year	with	the	exporter	in	the	DIAN	and	SIREM	data,	using	their	
NIT,	 in	 the	 data	 we	 observe	 4,956,935	 export	 transactions	 between	 a	 Colombian	
exporter	 and	an	 importer	 from	 the	 rest	of	 the	World.	 Importers	 are	 identified	using	
the	 company	name	and	country	of	 shipment	 (the	addresses	are	noisy	and	 therefore																																																									22	This	includes	all	transactions	falling	under	the	2-digit	product	category	27	in	the	harmonised	system.	
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are	 not	 used	 to	 clean	 the	 list	 of	 firms).	 Due	 to	misspelling	 and	 the	 use	 of	 different	
names	to	refer	to	the	same	company,	two	transactions	between	one	pair	may	appear	
in	 the	 data	 as	 two	 transactions	 between	 one	 exporter	 and	 two	 different	 importers,	





Some	 companies	 are	 reported	 with	 two	 names,	 distinguished	 by	 “Y/O”,	 which	 is	
Spanish	 for	“and/or”.	There	 is	no	way	of	understanding	which	of	 the	two	companies	
listed	 is	 the	 correct	 one	 so	we	 drop	 these	 observations.	 This	 amounts	 to	 5%	 of	 the	
total	transactions	and	5.2%	of	total	exports	covered	in	our	sample.		
After	 this	 initial	 harmonisation	 we	 perform	 a	 fuzzy	 matching	 between	 the	 181,535	
unique	 importers’	 names	 in	our	data	and	 the	 full	 list	of	 firms	with	positive	 turnover	
available	in	ORBIS	(approximately	8	million	companies),	i.e.	firms’	official	name.		
After	checking	manually	on	a	subsample	of	firms,	we	chose	to	use	the	Jaro	distance	to	




The	 Jaro	 distance	 goes	 from	 0	 (two	 strings	 are	 identical)	 to	 1	 (two	 strings	 have	 no	












We	 consider	 a	 match	 a	 firm	 that,	 despite	 not	 having	matched	 with	 ORBIS,	 is	 quite	






In	 this	way	we	group	together	 importers’	names	that	are	 likely	 to	correspond	to	 the	




Using	 the	 harmonised	 list	 of	 matched	 company	 names	 we	 perform	 a	 clustering	
procedure	based	again	on	the	Jaro	distance.	We	create	clusters	of	firms	whose	names	
have	a	string	distance	below	0.15,	by	country.	We	end	up	with	74,856	buyer-country	
clusters.	 We	 match	 these	 with	 the	 exporters	 and	 aggregate	 our	 initial	 4,965,935	
transactions	 by	 buyer-supplier-product-country	 (relationships)	 obtaining	 286,225	
relationships	over	7	years	yielding	an	unbalanced	panel	of	527,010	observations.		
There	 are	 only	 7,093	 exporters,	 although	when	we	 look	 at	 exporters	 by	 destination	
country	 the	 number	 rises	 to	 40,003.	 When	 we	 aggregate	 this	 across	 products	 we	
obtain	a	panel	with	267,320	pairs,	i.e.	buyer-supplier-country	combinations	(pairs).		
Because	we	identify	the	importers	at	the	country	level,	assuming	that	two	importers	in	










3. the	 median	 sophistication	 of	 the	 pair:	 this	 is	 the	 median	 product,	 based	 on	
sophistication,	weighted	on	trade	value	 in	 the	pair.	This	variable	captures	 the	
sophistication	of	the	“core”	of	trade	taking	place	in	a	pair;	
4. the	 average	 sophistication	 of	 the	 pair	 is	 the	 average	 of	 the	 sophistication	 of	
each	 product	 traded	 within	 the	 pair,	 weighted	 on	 the	 trade	 value	 of	 each	
product	in	the	pair.	This	is	an	alternative	measure	of	the	“core”	sophistication	
of	 the	 pair,	 although	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 number	 of	 products	 traded	
within	 the	 pair	 also	 affects	 this	measure.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 a	 pair	 exporting	
two	 products	 will	 have	 a	 higher	 average	 sophistication	 than	 another	 pair	
exporting	 the	 same	 two	products	plus	another	one	with	 sophistication	below	
the	average	of	the	other	two	products	traded.		
We	 now	 turn	 to	 power	 and	 how	 to	measure	 it.	 Bear	 in	mind	 that	 power	 has	 been	






1. the	supplier’s	dependence	vis-à-vis	 the	buyer	 in	a	given	 relationship24.	This	 is	
computed	 as	 the	 share	 that	 sales	 x	 of	 product	 p	 from	 supplier	 s	 to	 buyer	 b	
represents	 in	all	 the	sales	 (i.e.	across	all	products)	of	supplier	s.	This	 is	bound	
between	 0	 and	 1;	 when	 it	 approaches	 the	 latter	 it	 means	 that	 the	 supplier	
exports	most	of	its	product	p	to	the	buyer	b	and	has	a	high	level	of	dependence	
vis-à-vis	its	buyer.	This	measure	thus	increases	the	buyer’s	power.	We	are	using	
here	 the	 total	export	of	our	 supplier	as	a	denominator;	 an	alternative	option	
would	 have	 been	 to	 use	 the	 total	 sales,	 i.e.	 both	 domestic	 and	 foreign.	We	







and	 are	 as	 symmetric	 as	 possible,	we	 choose	 to	 look	 at	 foreign	 sales	 for	 the	
supplier	 and	 foreign	 purchases	 for	 the	 buyer.	 This	 still	 leaves	 unresolved	 the	
fact	 that	 while	 we	 observe	 all	 export	 destinations	 for	 the	 suppliers	 we	 only	
observe	what	 the	buyers	 import	 from	Colombia.	We	detail	how	we	deal	with	
this	later	in	this	section.		 𝑠𝑑𝑝!"# =  𝑥!"#𝑥!"#!"  
2. The	market	share	of	buyer	b	in	product	p,	i.e.	the	share	that	the	purchases	x	of	
buyer	b	in	product	p	of	total	export	(i.e.	across	all	suppliers)	of	product	p	from	
Colombia,	 i.e.	 the	degree	of	monopsony.	A	higher	market	 share	of	 the	buyer	
increases	the	market	component	of	the	buyer’s	power	over	the	supplier.		𝑏𝑠ℎ!" =  𝑥!"#! 𝑥!"#!"  






on	its	supplier,	which	increases	its	power	over	the	buyer.		𝑏𝑑𝑝!"# =  𝑥!"#𝑥!"#!"  
4. The	 market	 share	 of	 supplier	 s	 in	 product	 p,	 i.e.	 the	 share	 that	 sales	 x	 of	
supplier	s	 in	product	p	 represents	of	 total	exports	 (i.e.	across	all	 suppliers)	of	
product	p	 from	Colombia.	This	measure	captures	the	market	aspect	of	power	
and	reflects	the	position	that	the	supplier	occupies	in	the	market	of	the	product	
traded.	As	 the	measure	approaches	1	 it	means	 that	 the	supplier	 represents	a	
higher	share	of	the	market	and	has	therefore	a	higher	market	power.		𝑠𝑠ℎ!" =  𝑥!"#! 𝑥!"#!  
Based	on	the	discussion	above,	we	distinguish	different	kinds	of	power	depending	on	
its	 source.	 We	 argue	 that	 buyers’	 (and	 suppliers’)	 power	 is	 determined	 by	 a	































sophistication	 measures	 are	 at	 the	 pair	 level.	 Therefore,	 we	 aggregate	 the	 power	
indexes	 at	 the	 pair	 level,	 taking	 the	 averages	 across	 the	 products	 exchanged	within	
each	 pair	 in	 each	 year,	 weighting	 this	 on	 each	 product’s	 share	 in	 total	 COP	 traded	
within	each	pair.	
Because	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 our	 data,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 we	 also	 face	 another	
challenge	in	creating	the	power	measures.	We	only	have	information	on	exports	from	




suppliers	 and	 buyers	 in	 the	 three	main	 destination	 countries,	 i.e.	 the	US,	 Venezuela	
and	 Ecuador.	We	 then	 compute	 the	 share	 that	 Colombian	 exports	 represent	 in	 the	
imports	 of	 all	 products	 for	 each	 of	 these	 three	 countries.	 This	 captures	 how	 likely	
buyers	 are	 to	 find	 other	 suppliers	 in	 third	 countries;	 we	 multiply	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence	and	the	supplier’s	market	share	by	these	shares,	like	this	respectively:	
	
106		 𝑏𝑑𝑝!"# =  𝑥!"#𝑥!"!!" ∗𝑀𝑠ℎ!" 








To	 avoid	 this	 shortcoming,	 however,	 we	 would	 need	 to	 observe	 buyers’	 true	 size,	
which	are	not	included	in	our	data.	
Finally,	 despite	 focusing	 only	 on	 three	 destination	 countries,	 our	 subsample	 still	
accounts	for	45%	of	total	COP	traded	and	34%	of	the	total	number	of	transactions	in	
our	sample,	after	cleaning.		




tend	 to	 be	more	 dependent	 on	 buyers	 (col.	 1)	 than	 vice	 versa	 (col.	 3).	 At	 the	 same	
time,	buyers’	share	 (col.	2)	 tends	to	be	 larger	than	that	of	 the	suppliers	 (col.	4).	This	
suggests	 that,	 in	our	data,	buyers	are	overall	more	powerful	 than	suppliers.	We	also	
note	 that	 the	distribution	of	 these	 indexes	 is	 rather	 skewed;	positively	 for	 all	 power	
indexes	except	the	supplier’s	dependence,	which	shows	a	negative	skew.	This	means	
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worth	 recalling	 that	 these	 are	 computed	 through	 the	method	 of	 reflection	 and	 are	
therefore	not	meaningful	per	se,	they	give	us	however	an	idea	of	the	upper	and	lower	
bounds	between	which	our	measure	varies;	this	index	is	therefore	meaningful	only	in	
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level)	 and	 suppliers’	 (buyers’)	 diversification.	 It	 is	 nonetheless	 interesting	 to	 explore	
how	these	two	measures	are	related	since	 firms’	diversification	relates	 to	 the	power	
measures.	
Table	4.4	details	 the	distribution	of	 three	measures	of	diversification:	 the	number	of	
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suppliers	 the	 buyers	 buy	 from;	 this	 is	 because	 we	 only	 observe	 the	 transactions	
between	 Colombia	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world.	 These	 proportions	 are	 also	 similar	 to	
what	has	been	found	in	the	literature	(Bernard	et	al.	2014)26,	which	is	reassuring	with	





not	the	case;	the	reason	for	this	is	the	fact	that	we	adjust	the	two	components	(i.e.	the																																																									26	 Bernard	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 find	 lower	 numbers	 of	 both	 exporters	 and	 importers,	 because	 they	 propose	












In	 Figure	 4.1	 we	 see	 a	 slightly	 positive	 relationship	 between	 our	 two	 measures.	
Interestingly	 we	 can	 also	 see	 that	 while	 there	 are	 pairs	 trading	 at	 all	 levels	 of	





This	 suggests	 that	 as	 a	 supplier	 diversifies	 the	number	of	 products	 they	 sell	 to	 their	










Figure	 4.2	 offers	 further	 support	 to	 this	 conjecture,	 showing	 a	 slightly	 negative	

















diversification	does	not	necessarily	 improve	 the	overall	 sophistication	of	 a	 supplier’s	
exports,	but	is	attained	by	introducing	both	more	and	less	sophisticated	products.	




In	 Figure	 4.3	 we	 plot	 the	 number	 of	 traded	 products	 by	 each	 supplier	 against	 the	
number	of	 buyers	 and	 colour	 this	 based	on	 the	 centile	 in	which	 the	 supplier	 falls	 in	
terms	of	upper	bound	complexity.		




products	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 fairly	 unsophisticated	 (such	 as	 commodities).	 This	 is	












with	 high	 upper	 bound	 complexity	 that	 manage	 to	 have	 both	 a	 large	 number	 of	
suppliers	and	of	products	they	purchase.		
Overall,	however,	we	find	here	again	that	buyers	either	buy	many	products	from	few	










So,	 while	 product	 diversification	 (i.e.	 increases	 in	 the	 number	 of	 products	 traded	
within	a	pair)	seems	to	be	associated	both	to	increases	in	the	upper	bound	complexity	
and	 decreases	 in	 the	 lower	 bound	 complexity,	 diversification	 in	 terms	 of	 trading	
partners	seems	to	be	negatively	associated	with	upper	bound	complexity.		
This	 is	 purely	 explorative	 evidence.	 As	mentioned	 above,	 the	 components	 of	 power	









figures	 here	 each	 observation	 is	 a	 buyer-supplier	 pair,	which	means	 that	we	 have	 a	
very	 high	 number	 of	 observations;	 to	 maximise	 readability	 of	 the	 graphs	 we	 have	
therefore	 use	 a	 transparency	 parameter	 alpha,	 which	 allows	 plotting	 overlapping	
observations	by	making	these	a	slightly	transparent.	This,	coupled	with	a	high	diversity	





Interestingly,	 we	 note	 quite	 a	 few	 observations	 clustering	 along	 the	 45-degree	 line.	
Taking	 the	example	of	 the	buyer’s	 power,	 dots	on	 the	45-degree	 line	 correspond	 to	
pairs	 in	 which	 the	 supplier	 does	 not	 have	 rivals	 in	 his	 market.	 Therefore	 his	




This	 very	 same	mechanism	 applies	when	 plotting	 the	 supplier’s	 power	 components,	
i.e.	buyer’s	dependence	and	supplier’s	market	share,	 shown	 in	Figure	4.10.	Unlike	 in	





















that	 there	 is	a	 stark	difference	 in	 the	average	upper	and	 lower	bound	complexity	of	
exports	of	Colombian	suppliers	to	the	US	as	opposed	to	Ecuador	and	Venezuela.		
In	Figures	4.11	and	4.12,	we	look	at	the	average	sophistication	of	export	of	Colombian	
suppliers	 across	 the	 three	 main	 destination	 countries.	 We	 find	 that	 suppliers	 in	
Colombia	 on	 average	 export	 less	 sophisticated	 products	 to	 US	 than	 to	 Ecuador	 and	
Venezuela.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 for	 this	 finding	 is	 that	 importers	 from	 the	 US	
118		
purchase	sophisticated	products	from	other	countries	that	are	at	the	frontier	in	those	
products,	 and	 that	 Colombian	 exporters	 only	manage	 to	 trade	with	US	 importers	 in	










These	 differences	 may	 thus	 reflect	 different	 entry	 points	 in	 GVCs	 for	 Colombian	
exporters.	Trade	with	the	US	is	essentially	in	unsophisticated	products,	while	Colombia	
may	 be	 able	 to	 compete	 in	 more	 sophisticated	 goods	 in	 countries	 that	 are	 its	
119		

























































power	 are	 related	 to	 (i)	 levels	 of	 export	 sophistication,	 to	 investigate	 static	
relationships	between	power	and	export	sophistication,	as	well	as	the	dynamic	effects	
by	looking	at	(ii)	the	likelihood	of	introducing	a	new	product,	and	(iii)	the	likelihood	of	
increasing	 export	 sophistication,	 which	 we	 equate	 in	 our	 approach	 to	 export	
upgrading.	
While	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 export	 sophistication	 and	 the	 four	







the	 pair	 level;	 its	 focus	 is	 however	 the	 sophistication	 of	 the	 products	 traded	 by	 the	
supplier	to	the	buyer.	We	estimate	the	following	equation:	













The	duration	of	 the	 relationship	 is	 an	 important	determinant	of	 firms’	behaviour:	 as	




likely	 to	 build	 trust	 more	 quickly;	 for	 this	 reason	 we	 also	 look	 at	 the	 number	 of	
transactions	 taking	 place	within	 each	 pair	 in	 every	 year.	 This	 variable	 is	 likely	 to	 be	
related	 to	 the	characteristics	of	 the	product	 traded,	e.g.	 fresh	cut	 flowers	demand	a	
higher	number	of	transactions	per	year	than,	say,	furniture.		
To	deal	with	this,	the	number	of	transactions	is	standardised	across	products	and	then	
aggregated	 at	 the	 pair	 level.	 This	 captures	 how	 often	 two	 firms	 interact	 with	 each	
other	and	can	proxy	the	level	of	trust	existing	between	a	buyer	and	a	supplier.	This	is	






trade,	 the	more	 likely	 they	 are	 to	 learn	 about	 each	 other;	 second,	 trading	 in	more	
products	also	means	that	the	two	partners	will	be	operating	in	more	than	one	market	
in	which	the	market	aspect	of	power	may	vary	and,	third,	our	complexity	measures	are	
related	 to	 diversification	 itself,	 therefore	 one	 might	 expect	 that	 more	 diversified	
relationships	are	also	more	likely	to	be	trading	in	more	sophisticated	products.		
Total	factor	productivity	(TFP)	is	included	because	more	productive	suppliers	are	likely	
to	 be	more	 sophisticated	 and	 productivity	 is	 also	 a	 determinant	 of	 the	 governance	
(and	power	relationships)	under	which	firms	are	likely	to	operate	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005).	
We	 computed	TFP	using	data	 from	balance	 sheets	 provided	by	 SIREM.	 This	 includes	
information	on	fixed	costs,	 i.e.	 those	costs	 firms	will	have	to	sustain	regardless	of	 its	
production	level,	such	as	wages	and	variable	costs	that	are,	 in	contrast,	a	function	of	
the	production	such	as	inputs.		
We	 follow	 Wooldridge	 (2009)28	 and	 estimate	 a	 Cobb	 Douglas	 production	 function	
where	total	revenue	is	a	function	of	total	fixed	costs	to	capture	wages	(free	variable),	
total	 asset	 captures	 capital	 (state	 variable)	 and	 inputs	 as	 a	 proxy	 variable	 for	
productivity	itself.		




Finally,	 we	 also	 include	 time	 and	 pair	 dummies,	 τt	 and	 τp	 respectively	 to	 take	 into	






this	 will	 yield	 a	 very	 sparse	 matrix,	 i.e.	 with	 very	 few	 non-zero	 elements;	 this	 may	
prevent	computing	a	generalised	inverse	of	the	estimation	matrix.		







direct	 inference	on	 causality;	nonetheless,	our	main	objective	 is	 to	 test	whether	 the	
hypotheses	 put	 forward	 by	 the	 GVC	 literature,	 regarding	 power	 in	 buyer-supplier	
relationships	 as	 related	 to	 supplier’s	 upgrading	 perspectives,	 are	 supported	 by	 a	
quantitative	approach	relying	on	a	 large	sample	and	highly	disaggregated	transaction	
data.	Our	approach	allows	this	to	be	done,	while	also	contributing	to	the	growing	body	
of	 evidence	 at	 the	 transaction	 level,	 emphasising	 the	 importance	 of	 buyer-supplier	
relationships	for	trade	patterns.		
The	measures	of	complexity	we	have	presented	so	far,	of	course,	capture	the	level	of	
sophistication	 at	 which	 each	 supplier	 is	 trading	with	 a	 buyer.	 However,	 they	 tell	 us	
little	on	the	supplier’s	perspective	of	 improving,	which	 is	more	closely	related	to	the	
concept	of	upgrading.	To	also	include	this	more	dynamic	dimension	into	our	study,	we	









the	 package	 works,	 we	 refer	 the	 reader	 to	 the	 vignette	 freely	 available	 from	 the	 CRAN	 repository:	
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lfe/lfe.pdf.		
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The	 introduction	of	 new	products	 has	 been	 at	 the	 centre	of	 a	 growing	 literature	on	
trade	 (Goldberg	et	al.	2010;	 Iacovone	and	 Javorcik	2009,	2010b),	although	 there	 is	a	
paucity	of	evidence	concerning	power	in	trade	relationships	as	a	determinant.	We	also	
take	 our	 search	 further	 and	 explore	 how	 changes	 in	 the	 product	 portfolio	 of	 the	
supplier	affect	the	sophistication	of	exports,	which	here	is	a	proxy	for	upgrading.		
While	 the	 explanatory	 variables	 remain	 unchanged,	we	use	 as	 outcome	 variables	yrt	
the	following	six	dummy	variables	computed	as	follows:	








5. a	 dummy	 variable	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 median	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair	 has	
increased	from	the	previous	year;	
6. a	 dummy	 variable	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 average	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair	 has	
increased	from	the	previous	year.	




While	 we	 do	 not	 have	 enough	 information	 on	 the	 buyers	 to	 estimate	 what	 factors	
could	 be	 impacting	 their	 purchasing	 strategy,	 it	 seems	 unlikely	 that	 the	 power	
relationship	with	 its	supplier	would	be	a	 factor	 in	the	choice	of	 the	buyer	starting	to	
purchase	new	products.		
It	 is	 in	 contrast	 more	 likely	 that	 buyers	 that	 are	 already	 planning	 on	 buying	 a	 new	




they	 already	 have	 and	 introduce	 a	 new	 product,	 based	 on	 the	 power	 ruling	 their	
relationship	with	their	existing	supplier.		
With	 respect	 to	 the	 last	 four	 dummy	 variables,	we	 recognise	 that	 these	would	 only	
capture	 a	 fraction	of	what	one	 could	 consider	upgrading.	Referring	back	 to	 the	 four	
kinds	of	upgrading	spelled	out	 in	the	GVC	framework	(product,	process,	function	and	
value	chain)	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005),	upper	bound	complexity	and	the	introduction	of	new	
products	 would	 capture	 product	 upgrading,	 and	 possibly	 function	 and	 value	 chain	
upgrading	depending	on	what	 the	new	product	 introduced	 is	 and	how	different	 it	 is	
from	what	the	pair	was	exchanging	in	the	past.		
Lower	bound,	median	 and	 average	 complexity	 do	not	 necessarily	 refer	 to	 upgrading	
per	 se,	 as	 they	might	 be	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 pair	 simply	 dropping	 an	 unsophisticated	
product,	 although	 one	might	 expect	 that	 as	 firms	move	 up	 in	 the	 value	 chain	 they	
would	 specialise	 away	 from	 low-sophistication	 products.	 Average	 and	 median	
complexity	in	particular	have	the	advantage	of	capturing	the	sophistication	level	of	the	
bulk	of	the	export	flows	within	a	given	pair.		
So,	 to	 be	 sure,	 our	 complexity	 measures	 will	 not	 capture	 the	 whole	 spectrum	 of	
upgrading.	However,	they	offer	a	so	far	untapped	opportunity	to	look	at	sophistication	
of	 exports	 for	 very	disaggregated	product	 categories,	 using	 transaction	 level	 data	 to	
provide	 new	 quantitative	 evidence	 based	 on	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 buyer-supplier	
relationships.	









Concerning	 the	 two	 components	 of	 the	 buyer’s	 power	 (see	 Table	 4.1),	 these	 results	
suggest	 that	 pairs	 with	 a	 supplier	 that	 is	 heavily	 dependent	 on	 their	 buyer	 tend	 to	
trade	in	less	sophisticated	products.	In	contrast	pairs	with	a	buyer	with	a	large	market	
share	(i.e.	purchasing	a	large	share	of	product	exported	by	the	export	with	which	they	
trade)	 tend	 to	 trade	 in	 more	 sophisticated	 products,	 both	 at	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	
bounds	and	when	looking	at	the	median	and	average	sophistication.	Notwithstanding	
the	 caveats	 mentioned	 above,	 these	 results	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 (qualitative	
evidence-based)	 intuition	put	forward	 in	the	GVC	literature	that	 large	buyers	tend	to	
be	 larger	 firms	 purchasing	 more	 sophisticated	 products,	 while	 suppliers	 that	 are	
heavily	 dependent	 on	 their	 buyers	 tend	 to	 be	 smaller	 firms	 trading	 in	 low-
sophistication	products.		
Table	4.6:	Power	components	and	sophistication	




























































N.	obs.	 42741	 42741	 42758	 42758	











that	 a	 nuanced	 view	 of	 a	 buyer’s	 power	 may	 be	 required	 when	 looking	 at	 buyer-
supplier	 relationships.	 A	 pair	 in	 which	 the	 power	 of	 the	 buyer	 comes	 from	 high	
dependence	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 supplier	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 trading	 in	 unsophisticated	
products,	while	the	opposite	will	be	true	for	pairs	in	which	the	buyer’s	market	share	is	
the	source	of	its	power.		
The	 supplier’s	 power	 components	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 significant	 relationship	 only	 with	
respect	 to	 the	median	and	average	 complexity;	 this	 relationship	 is	negative	 for	both	
variables,	suggesting	that	pairs	with	a	strong	supplier	tend	to	trade	in	unsophisticated	
products.	An	intuitive	explanation	may	have	to	do	with	the	sectors	in	which	suppliers	
with	 large	 market	 shares	 in	 Colombia	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 concentrated,	 such	 as	
commodities	 like	 coffee	 and	 flowers.	 However,	 time-invariant	 effects	 from	 these	
macro	sectors	are	likely	to	be	accounted	for	by	the	supplier	level	fixed	effect.		
Another	possible	explanation	 for	our	 results	 could	be	 that	 suppliers	 in	Colombia	are	












This	 suggests	 that	 a	 larger	 number	 of	 products	 traded	 is	 not	 necessarily	 associated	
with	 a	higher	 level	 of	 capabilities,	 but	 rather	 to	 a	diversification	 towards	both	more	
and	less	sophisticated	products.	
The	same	seems	 to	hold	 for	 the	number	of	 transactions:	pairs	with	high	 frequencies	
tend	 to	 trade	 with	 a	 larger	 range	 of	 complexity	 at	 both	 ends,	 which	 again	 hints	 at	
diversification	rather	than	upgrading	per	se.		
Total	 factor	 productivity	 (TFP)	 shows	 a	 positive	 association	 with	 upper	 bound	
complexity,	which	was	to	be	expected.	We	find,	however,	a	negative	association	with	
the	 average	 complexity	 of	 the	 pair;	while	 this	may	 seem	 counter-intuitive	 at	 first,	 a	
possible	 explanation	 for	 this	 is	 that	more	productive	 suppliers	 also	 tend	 to	be	more	
diversified,	which	is	likely	to	drive	down	the	average	complexity;	it	is	also	possible	that	
exporters	 in	Colombia	are	more	productive	 in	 low-complexity	products,	which	would	
also	explain	these	results.	
The	four	complexity	measures	used	so	far	capture	characteristics	of	the	distribution	of	
the	 sophistication	 of	 products	 traded	 within	 each	 pair,	 in	 particular	 the	 maximum,	
minimum,	 the	median	 and	 the	 average.	 They	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 products’	 feature	 of	
different	pairs,	based	on	the	characteristics	of	the	power	relationship	the	suppliers	and	
buyers	 establish	with	 each	other,	 controlling	 for	 each	other,	 and	 a	 number	of	 other	
control	variables.			
4.5.2	Power	measures	and	the	introduction	of	new	products	in	buyer-supplier	pairs	
Aside	 from	 sophistication	 levels,	 we	 are	 also	 interested	 in	 exploring	 the	 dynamic	
aspects	 of	 this,	 in	 particular	 to	 see	 whether	 buyer-supplier	 pairs	 introduce	 new	
products	to	their	product	portfolio;	to	explore	this	possibility	we	also	perform	a	linear	
probability	 model	 with	 two	 different	 outcome	 variables.	 These	 are	 the	 first	 two	
dummy	variables	we	have	already	introduced	as	additional	outcome	variables.		
In	Table	4.7,	 the	first	column	has	as	outcome	variable	a	dummy	taking	value	1	 if	 the	
pair	introduces	a	new	product	from	the	year	before;	we	refer	to	this	as	a	product	new-
to-the-pair.	We	add	here	the	past	level	of	upper	bound	complexity	(pci)	as	a	covariate,	
to	control	 for	past	 levels	of	sophistication	of	 the	pair.	The	second	and	third	columns	
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have	an	outcome	variable	 taking	 value	1	 if	 the	pair	 introduces	 a	product	 that	 is	 not	
only	new	to	the	pair	but	also	to	the	supplier,	 i.e.	 the	supplier	was	not	exporting	this	































































N.	obs.	 42739	 42739	 42739	
R2	 0.37	 0.37	 0.73	
Linear	 probability	 model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	
dummies.		
Dependent	variable	 in	col.	1	 is	a	dummy	taking	value	1	 if	 the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	
if	 the	 pair	 introduces	 a	 new	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 wasn’t	
exporting	in	the	year	before.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	













see	 that	 a	 lot	 changes	when	we	 control	 for	 the	dummy	 for	 the	 introduction	of	 new	




A	possible	explanation	 for	 the	 significance	of	 the	coefficients	 for	our	power	 indexes,	
when	 looking	 at	 new-to-the-supplier	 products	 but	 not	 at	 the	 new-to-the-pair,	 could	
have	 to	 do	 with	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 introduction	 of	 products	 that	 the	 supplier	 has	 not	
produced	in	the	past,	and	the	switching	cost	of	finding	a	new	trading	partner,	which	is	








product	 not	meeting	 the	 buyer’s	 requirements	 will	 make	 it	 more	 appealing	 for	 the	
buyer	 to	 sustain	 the	 cost	 of	 looking	 for	 a	 new	 supplier,	 and	 power	will	 be	 a	 factor	








In	 particular,	 pairs	 with	 high	 supplier	 dependence	 seem	 more	 likely	 to	 introduce	
products	 that	 the	 supplier	 has	 not	 previously	 exported.	 This	 may	 be	 because	 a	
supplier’s	 dependence	 on	 the	 buyer	means	 that	 it	 has	more	 at	 stake	 and	will	make	
sure	to	comply	with	the	buyer’s	requirements,	which	in	turn	may	convince	the	buyer	
to	“trust”	the	supplier	with	the	production	of	the	new	product.	We	address	the	issue	










may	be	 inclined	to	 find	new	suppliers	 in	order	to	avoid	 increasing	their	dependence.	
This	explains	why	the	index	is	negatively	related	to	our	outcome	variable.		
Finally,	a	large	market	share	for	the	supplier	will	make	it	more	likely	that	the	supplier	
will	 convince	 the	 buyer	 to	 purchase	 a	 product	 that	 the	 supplier	 has	 not	 produced	





Turning	 to	 the	 control	 variables,	 in	 the	 first	 column	 of	 Table	 4.7	 we	 see	 that	 the	
number	 of	 products	 exported	 in	 the	 previous	 period,	 the	 upper	 bound	 complexity	
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N.	obs.	 42724	 42724	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.24	 0.28	 0.32	 0.2	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	
an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	of	 the	sophistication	measure	on	which	the	outcome	variable	 is	










new	 finding	 suggests,	however,	 that	 the	new	products	 introduced	are	unlikely	 to	be	
more	sophisticated	than	those	in	which	the	pair	 is	already	trading;	this	again	hints	at	
the	risk	 for	highly	dependent	suppliers	of	being	stuck	 in	 low-sophistication	activities.	
This	 is	 something	very	much	 in	 line	with	 the	 findings	of	 the	GVC	 literature,	 stressing	
how	highly	dependent	suppliers	are	unlikely	to	upgrade.		
In	 contrast,	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	 buyer	 has	 a	 negative	 relationship	 with	 the	
likelihood	of	 increasing	 the	median	 and	 lower	 bound	 complexity,	 but	 a	 positive	 one	
with	the	probability	of	increasing	the	upper	bound	complexity.	This	suggests	that	high	
levels	 of	 buyer’s	 dependence	 are	 positively	 related	 to	 upgrading	 at	 the	 top,	 i.e.	
including	new	more	sophisticated	products,	but	negatively	related	to	upgrading	at	the	
bottom,	i.e.	it	is	less	likely	that	the	pair	will	drop	low-sophistication	products.	Because	
average	complexity	 is	 influenced	by	both	upper	and	 lower	bound	sophistication,	 it	 is	




sophistication.	We	see	 that	as	both	dependencies	 increase	 the	chances	of	 increasing	
either	the	median	or	the	lower	bound	sophistication	decrease33.		
This	suggests	that	the	higher	the	dependence	in	a	pair,	the	less	likely	the	pair	is	to	drop	
low-sophistication	products.	However,	we	 see	 that	when	 the	buyer	 is	 dependent	on	
the	supplier	it	is	more	likely	to	improve	the	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	pair.		




much	 lower	 than	 that	 of	 the	 supplier,	 as	 we	 saw	 in	 Table	 4.2.	 Specifically,	 the	 coefficients	 for	 the	
supplier’s	 dependence	 in	 Table	 4.7	 are	 2-5	 times	 smaller	 than	 the	 coefficients	 for	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence.	 In	 Table	 4.2	 the	 average	 buyer’s	 dependence	 is	 three	 times	 smaller	 than	 the	 average	
supplier’s	dependence.		
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positive	 effect	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increasing	 the	 pair’s	 upper	 bound	 sophistication	
suggests	 that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 introducing	 a	 new	 product	 with	 a	 high	 level	 of	
sophistication	 (which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 even	 riskier),	 buyers	 are	 likely	 to	 stick	 to	 the	
supplier	from	which	they	are	currently	buying	a	large	share	of	their	total	purchases.	So,	
we	can	conjecture	that	while	buyers	that	are	heavily	dependent	would	try	to	introduce	





as	 pairs	 increase	 the	 duration	 of	 their	 partnership,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 dropping	 low-
sophistication	 products	 also	 increases,	 thus	 increasing	 the	 pair’s	 lower	 bound	
complexity.		
Past	levels	of	the	sophistication	measure	are	negatively	associated	with	the	likelihood	
of	 this	measure	 to	 increase.	 This	 again	hints	 at	 a	 sort	 of	 “catching-up”,	 and	 thereby	





measures	 of	 complexity.	 This	 hints	 at	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 catching	 up	 with	 highly	
diversified	 pairs	 already	 exporting	 sophisticated	 products,	 therefore	 struggling	 to	




















for	 Ecuador	 and	 Venezuela.	When	 looking	 at	 Ecuador	 and	 Venezuela	 as	 destination	




power	 measures	 on	 the	 current	 complexity	 measures.	 With	 respect	 to	 our	 initial	
model,	 the	 starkest	 difference	 is	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 association	 of	 the	 buyer’s	 market	







market	 shares	 are	 associated	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	 export	 sophistication.	 However,	
buyers	 dominating	 the	 market	 in	 high-income	 countries	 import	 low-sophistication	






























































N.	obs.	 16642	 16642	 16650	 16650	
R2	 0.95	 0.96	 0.98	 0.99	
OLS	regression	results	with	time	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	Estimates	based	
on	pairs	with	US	based	buyers	only.			






We	now	turn	 to	 the	 likelihood	of	 introducing	a	new	product,	 replicating	Table	4.6	 in	
Table	 4.10	 below.	 Overall,	 we	 find	 rather	 similar	 results,	 with	 some	 minor	 loss	 of	
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N.	obs.	 16640	 16640	 16640	
R2	 0.39	 0.39	 0.74	














When	 we	 turn	 to	 the	 likelihood	 of	 pairs	 increasing	 their	 sophistication	 through	




likelihood	 of	 increasing	 the	 upper	 bound	 complexity.	 This	 suggests	 that	 suppliers	
trading	with	buyers	with	large	market	shares	from	the	US	are	likely	to	have	low	export	











Interestingly,	 when	 we	 exclude	 US	 buyers	 from	 our	 sample35,	 we	 find	 that	 the	
supplier’s	 market	 share	 has	 a	 positive	 relationship	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	 dropping	
unsophisticated	products.		
This	 suggests	 that	 large	 suppliers	 from	 Colombia	 do	 not	 manage	 to	 upgrade	 with	
buyers	from	the	US	and	therefore	remain	“trapped”	in	what	they	do,	using	their	large																																																									35	The	results	of	this	specification	are	presented	in	Table	A18	in	section	4.3	of	the	Appendix.	
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N.	obs.	 16633	 16633	 16650	 16650	
R2	 0.24	 0.32	 0.34	 0.21	
Linear	 probability	model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	 dummies.	 Estimates	 based	 on	 pairs	
with	US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	
an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	of	 the	sophistication	measure	on	which	the	outcome	variable	 is	









on	 whether	 they	 are	 based	 on	 the	 dyadic	 mutual	 dependence	 of	 the	 two	 trading	
parties	or	the	market	share	that	each	buyer	and	supplier	has.		
We	 have	 also	 shown	 that	 these	 associations	 are	 likely	 to	 change	 depending	 on	 the	






Based	 on	 the	 wealth	 of	 evidence	 presented,	 we	 now	 attempt	 to	 draw	 some	
conclusions	 on	 how	 power	 in	 buyer-supplier	 relationships	 is	 related	 to	 the	
sophistication	of	products	that	the	supplier	exports,	as	well	as	to	the	likelihood	of	new	
products	being	introduced	and	upgrading	taking	place.		
Our	 overarching	 contribution	 consists	 of	 testing	 insights	 from	 the	 GVC	 literature	 on	
power	and	sophistication	in	a	quantitative	setting,	providing	a	measurable	definition	of	
power	 and	 evidence	 from	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 firms	 from	 a	 developing	 country,	 i.e.	
Colombia.	In	doing	this	we	also	enrich	the	scholarship	on	trade	among	heterogeneous	
firms,	which	has	 largely	overlooked	the	 importance	of	power	and	upgrading	 in	 trade	
patterns.	
In	an	attempt	to	measure	the	relevance	of	power	in	buyer-supplier	relationships	more	
consistently,	 we	 conceptualise	 power	 as	 the	 result	 of	 both	 relational	 and	 dyadic	
aspects	 linked	 to	 the	 relationship	 between	 buyer	 and	 supplier,	 and	market	 aspects	
that	have	to	do	with	the	position	of	each	trading	partner	 in	the	market	 in	which	the	
relationships	are	 taking	place.	We	operationalise	 these	 two	 sources	of	power	 in	 this	




with	 each	 buyer,	 as	 being	 affected	 by	 power	 structure.	 Export	 sophistication	 has	
attracted	 significant	 attention	 in	 the	 recent	 literature	 because	 it	 is	 often	 positively	




Sophistication	describes	 the	 features	of	 a	 product,	 so	we	analyse	 the	distribution	of	
such	 measure	 for	 each	 supplier’s	 export	 portfolio.	 In	 particular	 we	 consider	 the	




relationship	 to	 the	 level	 of	 sophistication,	 the	 introduction	 of	 new	 products	 and	
upgrading,	 and	 that	 their	 two	 components	 (relational	 and	 market)	 show	 at	 times	
opposing	 associations.	 This	 suggests	 that	 powerful	 buyers	 (or	 suppliers)	 may	 be	
associated	 with	 different	 patterns	 of	 capabilities	 and	 upgrading,	 depending	 on	 the	
source	of	their	power.		
Concerning	the	buyer’s	power,	we	find	that	supplier’s	dependence	vis-à-vis	the	buyer	
is	 consistently	 negatively	 associated	 with	 all	 four	 measures	 of	 complexity,	 which	
suggests	that	pairs	with	heavily	dependent	suppliers	tend	to	trade	in	unsophisticated	
products.	 Moreover,	 we	 also	 find	 a	 positive	 association	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	
introducing	 new	 products,	 but	 a	 negative	 one	 with	 seeing	 the	 pair’s	 sophistication	
increase.		
These	 results	 suggest	 that	 pairs	 in	 which	 the	 buyer’s	 power	 is	 due	 to	 a	 highly	
dependent	supplier	are	likely	to	be	stuck	in	low-sophistication	activities,	where	despite	





to	 trade	 in	 relatively	 sophisticated	 products,	 but	 are	 not	 likely	 to	 introduce	 new	
products.	 This	 suggests	 that	 such	 pairs	 are	 less	 prone	 to	 introduce	 new	products	 or	
increase	their	sophistication.	However,	this	is	probably	because	pairs	with	buyers	with	






The	 power	 of	 the	 supplier	 also	 shows	 heterogeneous	 correlations	 between	 its	 two	
components	and	our	complexity	measures.	We	find	that	pairs	with	a	strong	supplier,	
either	 because	 of	 large	 market	 shares	 or	 a	 dependent	 buyer,	 tend	 to	 trade	 in	 low	
sophistication	products.	However,	pairs	in	which	the	source	of	the	supplier’s	power	is	
its	market	share	are	more	likely	to	introduce	products	that	are	new	to	the	supplier,	but	
we	 do	 not	 detect	 any	 relationship	 with	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increasing	 any	 of	 the	
complexity	measures.		
In	 contrast,	 we	 find	 that	 pairs	 in	 which	 the	 power	 of	 the	 supplier	 comes	 from	 the	
dependence	of	 the	 buyer	 are	more	 likely	 to	 increase	 their	 upper	 bound	 complexity,	





significantly	 higher	 level	 of	 economic	 complexity	 and	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 at	 a	 larger	
technological	distance	from	Colombia,	i.e.	the	US.	
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This	 suggests	 that,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 buyers	 in	 the	 US	 purchase	 unsophisticated	
products	from	Colombia,	and	this	is	particularly	the	case	for	buyers	with	large	market	
shares.	 Such	 buyers	 are	 also	 less	 likely	 to	 increase	 the	 sophistication	 of	 their	
purchases.	A	tentative	explanation	for	this	is	that	buyers	in	the	US	are	more	integrated	
in	 the	 global	 market	 and	 will	 purchase	 sophisticated	 products	 from	 suppliers	 from	
other	countries	at	 the	frontier	 in	such	markets.	This	conjecture	would	also	be	 in	 line	
with	the	GVC	literature	that	shows	that	suppliers’	capabilities	(crudely	proxied	here	by	
countries’	economic	complexity)	are	 taken	 into	account	by	 lead	 firms	 in	GVCs,	when	
establishing	governance	along	the	GVC	(Gereffi	et	al.	2005).	
In	 contrast,	 buyers	 in	 sophisticated	 economies	 like	 the	 US	 will	 buy	 unsophisticated	














and	 through	 statistical	 analysis;	 more	 complete	 data	 would	 help	 to	 account	 for	
ownership	linkages	across	firms	as	well	as	to	identify	firms’	foreign	buyers	with	more	
certainty.	Future	 research	efforts	 should	also	be	devoted	 to	disentangling	 the	causal	
relationship	between	power	and	export	sophistication.		
A	 limitation	 of	 the	 data	 used	 in	 this	 study	 is	 the	 impossibility	 of	 identifying	 the	
proportion	of	 value	added	 that	each	 firm	contributes	 to	 its	own	product;	 this	would	
allow	us	to	distinguish	between	firms	that	carry	out	the	whole	production	process	in-





more	 nuanced	 view	 of	 both	 buyer’s	 and	 supplier’s	 power,	 distinguishing	 between	
market	and	relational	sources	and	showing	that	these	are	associated	in	different	ways	
with	suppliers’	export	sophistication	and	capabilities.		
We	 also	 explore	 these	 associations	 across	 destination	 countries,	 finding	 relevant	
differences,	 especially	 between	 high-income	 countries	 at	 the	 technological	 frontier	
and	other	neighbouring	emerging	economies.	
In	 doing	 this	 we	 also	 expand	 the	 growing	 literature	 using	 transaction	 level	 data	 to	
explore	the	buyer-supplier	relationship.	Starting	from	the	insights	of	the	GVC	literature	
on	power	and	upgrading,	we	integrate	these	concepts	with	the	evidence	on	the	buyer-
supplier	matching	process	and	heterogeneity	 in	 trade.	As	part	of	 this	effort,	we	also	
put	 forward	 a	 novel	 empirical	 approach	 to	 compute	 power	 and	 sophistication	 with	
transaction	 level	 trade	 data	 from	 customs,	 which	 are	 a	 recent	 and	 increasingly	





The	 overall	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 to	 explore	 the	 relationship	 between	 GVCs	
participation	 and	 structural	 change	 at	 the	 macro,	 meso-	 and	 micro	 level.	 We	 have	
delved	 in	 particular	 into	 the	 issues	 of	 (i)	 countries’	 specialisation	 and	 their	
performance	 in	GVCs,	 (ii)	 the	opportunities	the	domestic	structure,	and	 intermediate	
domestic	 demand	 from	 natural	 resource	 industries	 in	 particular,	 offers	 to	 diversify	
through	GVC	participation	 in	KIBS	and,	 finally,	 (iii)	 the	association	between	power	 in	
trade	relationships	and	export	sophistication.		
We	 now	 review	 our	main	 findings	 and	 draw	 some	 conclusions	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	
policy	 implications,	which	are	particularly	 relevant	 following	 the	 recent	 re-ignition	of	




of	 countries’	 economic	 structure	 and	 the	 transformation	 process	 it	 undergoes	 as	
countries	develop.	Economies’	specialisation	trajectories	have	become	the	outcome	of	
cross-country	 interdependencies,	 in	 which	 all	 countries	 are	 co-producers	 in	 GVCs,	
rather	 than	 the	 result	 of	 independent	 domestic	 production	 processes.	 As	 a	
consequence	of	this,	the	relationship	between	export	specialisation	and	the	underlying	
domestic	 productive	 structure	 has	 changed,	 as	 gross	 exports	 are	 increasingly	 the	
outcome	of	both	foreign	import	and	domestic	production.		
Based	on	 this	novel	 theoretical	understanding	of	 the	relationship	between	economic	
structure,	 its	 transformation	 process	 and	 GVCs,	 we	 have	 explored	 the	 relationship	
between	trade	specialisation	and	performance	with	a	value-added	approach.		
In	 doing	 this,	we	 not	 only	 looked	 at	 the	 direction	 of	 countries’	 specialisation,	 i.e.	 in	







and	 what	 it	 actually	 produces;	 policies	 trying	 to	 infer	 countries’	 domestic	 structure	
based	on	gross	export	risk	being	based	on	misleading	premises.		
Despite	the	optimism	that	GVCs	have	sparked	in	terms	of	providing	easier	and	faster	
access	 to	 the	global	market,	we	 find	 that	 specialisation	 trajectories	countries	 take	 in	
participating	 in	 GVCs	 do	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 their	 economic	 performance;	 this	 is	
relevant	for	policy	makers	implementing	export	oriented	policies.		
Concerning	 the	 direction	 of	 countries’	 trade	 patterns,	 while	 in	 the	 past	 countries	
specialising	 in	 low-tech,	 labour	 intensive,	manufacturing	 have	 been	 able	 to	 upgrade	
towards	 high-tech	 and	more	 capital	 intensive	manufacturing	 (Lin	 and	Monga	 2010),	
our	results	suggest	that	specialising	in	low-tech	activities	now	exerts	a	negative	effect	
on	countries’	growth	in	domestic	value	added	(DVA)	exported.		
In	 addition,	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 also	 seems	 a	 difficult	 specialisation	 trajectory	
from	a	development	standpoint:	while	we	find	a	positive	effect	during	the	crisis	period,	
we	find	no	evidence	over	the	whole	time	span	of	our	sample.		
This	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 policies	 aimed	 at	 fostering	 specialisation	 in	 low-tech	
manufacturing	 in	order	 to	 then	move	onto	high-tech	manufacturing	may	not	 lead	 to	
the	same	positive	outcome	of	the	past.	
Concerning	 services,	 despite	 the	 recent	 optimism	 about	 the	 new	 specialisation	
possibilities	 stemming	 from	 the	 increasing	 offshoring	 of	 these	 activities	 (Gereffi	 and	




find	 no	 evidence	 that	 such	 a	 specialisation	 trajectory	 may	 have	 long-term	 positive	
effects	on	countries’	exports	in	DVA.		
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To	 some	 extent,	 this	 supports	 Rodrik's	 (2015b)	 concerns	 regarding	 developing	
countries’	 tendency	 to	specialise	 in	KIBS	at	 increasingly	early	stages	of	development,	




only	 relevant	 in	 shaping	 their	 export	 performance,	 but	 also	 in	 promoting	 the	
emergence	of	new	sectors.		
Revisiting	 Hirschman's	 (1958)	 contribution	 on	 inter-sectoral	 linkages,	 this	 thesis	 has	
explored	 in	 particular	 whether	 natural	 resource	 industries	 (NRI)	 can	 provide	 large	
enough	domestic	intermediate	demand	to	foster	the	emergence	of	other	sectors.	This	
is	particularly	 interesting	because	natural	 resources	have	often	been	associated	with	






In	 this	 thesis	 we	 have	 focused	 on	 a	 specular	 avenue,	 looking	 at	 backward	 linkages	
stemming	from	NRI	to	KIBS,	as	well	as	high-tech	manufacturing.	Chapter	2	shows	that	
both	 have	 proved	 to	 be	 hard	 specialisation	 avenues	 for	 developing	 countries	 (see	
Figure	2.3).		
Taking	 again	 a	 value	 added	 approach,	 we	 find	 the	 strength	 of	 domestic	 backward	
linkages	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	the	export	of	DVA	in	KIBS;	 interestingly,	we	find	
these	effects	to	be	even	stronger	for	countries	with	a	revealed	comparative	advantage	
in	 NRI.	 We	 find	 similar	 results	 for	 high-tech	 manufacturing,	 although	 the	 effect	
vanishes	once	we	account	for	the	productivity	in	NRI.	
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The	 thesis	 revisits	 the	debate	 around	 the	existence	of	 a	natural	 resource	 curse	 and,	
more	 specifically,	 contributes	 to	 the	 growing	 body	 of	 evidence	 emphasising	 the	
importance	 of	 services	 backward-linked	 to	 NRI	 in	 countries	 with	 natural	 resource-
based	 economies	 (Marin	 et	 al.	 2009;	 Marin	 and	 Smith	 2010;	 Marin	 and	 Benavente	
2011;	Urzua	2012).	
Within	this	stream	of	work,	we	propose	a	novel	path	for	countries	to	take	advantage	of	
their	 NRI	 to	 spur	 exports	 in	 other	 sectors.	 Instead	 of	 looking	 at	 forward	 linked	
manufacturing	 activities,	 we	 show	 that	 countries	 with	 large	 NRI	 can	 use	 backward	








In	 order	 to	 study	 GVCs	 at	 the	 micro	 level,	 we	 use	 transaction	 level	 data	 from	 the	
Colombian	 Customs	 and	 match	 these	 with	 complexity	 measures	 from	 the	 Atlas	 of	
Complexity	 for	 Colombia.	 This	 measure	 of	 complexity	 has	 been	 used	 to	 compute	
export	 sophistication	 and	 upgrading	 (Zhu	 and	 Fu	 2013;	 Poncet	 and	 Starosta	 de	
Waldemar	2013;	Jarreau	and	Poncet	2012).		
The	transaction	data	provide	information	on	what	each	Colombian	exporter	is	trading,	
in	 what	 amount,	 and	 with	 which	 buyer.	 We	 use	 this	 information	 to	 operationalise	
power	 focusing	 on	 two	 different	 aspects,	 which	 we	 refer	 to	 relational	 and	 market	
power	respectively.		




two	 firms	 in	a	 trade	 relationship	occupies	 in	 the	market.	 Therefore	we	compute	 the	
market	share	for	each	buyer	and	supplier.		
Our	main	finding	is	that	power	in	trade	relationships	is	correlated	to	the	sophistication	




market	 –	 its	 association	 to	 export	 sophistication	 and	upgrading	will	 vary.	We	 find	 in	
fact	 that	when	 the	buyer’s	power	stems	 from	a	high	dependence	on	 the	part	of	 the	
supplier	 on	 the	buyer,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 supplier	will	 be	 trading	 in	 unsophisticated	




In	 contrast,	 suppliers	 trading	with	a	buyer	 that	draws	 its	power	 from	a	 large	market	
share	 tend	 to	 export	 more	 sophisticated	 products.	 However,	 they	 have	 a	 smaller	
chance	of	introducing	new	products,	arguably	because	the	buyer	is	already	trading	in	
many	 sophisticated	 products,	 and	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 convinced	 to	 introduce	 new	
products.	Interestingly,	the	positive	correlation	between	the	buyer’s	market	share	and	
the	 level	 of	 export	 sophistication	 is	 reversed	 when	 we	 only	 look	 at	 trading	
relationships	 with	 the	 US;	 this	 suggests	 that	 the	 association	 between	 power	 and	
sophistication	 is	 likely	 to	 change	 depending	 on	 the	 size,	 sophistication	 and	 level	 of	
integration	of	the	destination	country.	
Concerning	 the	 power	 of	 the	 supplier,	 while	 we	 find	 that	 both	 kinds	 of	 power	 are	
negatively	 associated	 to	 the	 sophistication	 level	 of	 exports,	 we	 find	 different	
associations	when	 looking	at	 the	possibility	of	 introducing	new	products	 and	 that	of	











export	upgrading	and	development.	This	 is	 true	at	 the	macro	 level,	as	we	have	seen	
that	 domestic	 specialisation	 and	 inter-sectoral	 linkages	 shape	 countries’	 export	
performance	in	GVCs,	as	well	as	the	emergence	of	new	sectors;	at	the	micro	level,	we	
have	offered	evidence	that	power	 in	buyer-supplier	relationships	 is	 related	to	export	
sophistication.		




In	 addition	 to	 Rodrik’s	 (2015a)	 concerns	 for	 developing	 countries’	 premature	
deindustrialisation	 in	 favour	 of	 services,	 we	 also	 find	 support	 for	 the	 idea	 that	
manufacturing	as	an	engine	of	growth	may	be	running	at	less	than	full	power	(Rodrik	
2016a).	 In	 fact,	 we	 find	 low-tech	 manufacturing	 to	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	
countries’	 trade	performance,	and	only	modest	 support	 in	 favour	of	 increases	 in	 the	
specialisation	in	high-tech	manufacturing.		
So,	 the	 emergence	 of	 GVCs	 has	 made	 it	 very	 important	 to	 understand	 how	 value	
added	is	distributed	across	countries	and	sectors	in	each	GVC.		
Fragmentation	 of	 production	 is	 in	 fact	 heterogeneous	 across	 sectors	 and	 countries,	








tasks.	 Our	 data	 do	 not	 allow	 the	 investigation	 of	 this	 specific	 issue,	 because	 input-
output	 tables	 allow	 tracking	 value	 added	 across	 industries	 at	 an	 aggregate	 level,	
without	providing	information	at	the	task	level.		
How	value	added	 is	distributed	across	sectors	and	tasks	 in	GVCs	 is	also	 important	 to	
understand	how	countries	GVC	participation	 is	 impacting	technological	dynamics	and	
skill	requirements	 in	the	 labour	market	at	the	domestic	 level.	While	the	data	used	in	






mid-1990s,	 this	 considerably	 limits	 researchers’	 ability	 to	 explore	 longer-term	
phenomena,	especially	related	to	structural	change.		












domestically	 owned	 firms	 and	 foreign	 companies’	 subsidiaries.	While	 both	 the	 GVC	
literature	 (Gereffi	 et	 al.	 2005)	 and	 the	 literature	on	business	 and	management	have	
long	 ago	 established	 that	 the	 ownership	 relationship	 between	 headquarters	 and	
subsidiaries	 is	 an	 important	 determinant	 of	 how	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 are	
localised	 and	 transferred	 (Blomström	 and	 Kokko	 1998;	 Gao	 et	 al.	 2007;	 Figueiredo	
2010),	 little	 quantitative	 evidence	 has	 been	 put	 forward	 to	 study	 this	 in	 a	 GVC	
framework.	 Further	 research,	 with	 a	 quantitative	 approach,	 is	 thus	 needed	 to	
investigate	how	power	and	export	sophistication	are	related	to	foreign	ownership.		
A	second	limitation	of	our	data	has	to	do	with	the	fact	that,	in	this	thesis,	we	can	only	
rely	 on	 suppliers’	 gross	 exports,	 which	 we	 have	 seen	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 very	
representative	of	firms’	actual	contribution	in	value	added	terms.		
While	 an	 obvious	 possibility	 would	 be	 to	 include	 import	 data	 in	 the	 analysis,	 the	




Relatedly,	 more	 efforts	 are	 needed	 to	 trace	 value	 added	 within	 firms’	 production	
processes	 to	 be	 able	 to	 examine	 whether	 GVC	 participation	 differs	 from	 trade	 tout	
court.	It	would	be	particularly	interesting	to	study	whether	firms	that	import	to	export,	





In	 conclusion,	 future	 research	 at	 the	 micro	 level	 would	 benefit	 greatly	 from	
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































HTM	respectively.	We	observe	that	 for	all	 these	three	sectors,	 in	addition	to	KIBS	 (cfr	Figure	
2.1),	DVA	RCAs	compared	to	their	gross	export	homologue	do	not	simply	“deflate”	the	RCA.	In	
contrast,	we	observe	that	some	countries	have	higher	RCAs	when	we	compute	these	with	DVA	
compared	 to	 gross	 exports.	 This	 offers	 further	 support	 to	 the	 view	 that	 measuring	 trade	













Figure	A.2:	 Country	Average	RCA	 in	 LTM	across	 years	 in	 gross	 exports	 and	domestic	 value	
added	













Figure	 2.2	 shows	 specialisation	 trends	 across	 high-income	 and	 developing	 countries,	
for	 completeness’s	 sake	 we	 reproduce	 here	 the	 same	 figure	 without	 distinguishing	
countries	 based	 on	 income	 per	 capita.	 Figure	 A.4	 shows	 the	 average	 RCA	 across	
countries	over	years	in	our	four	sector	groups.	There	is	a	clear	trend	of	moving	away	
from	 natural	 resources	 and	 low-tech	 manufacturing,	 while	 the	 trend	 seems	 to	 be	



















that	 reallocates	 value	added	based	on	 the	 sector	of	production,	 and	F	 is	 a	 vector	of	
final	demand.		
If	we	take	an	example	with	three	countries,	a,	b,	and	c,	this	can	be	depicted	as	follows:		





𝑣!𝑏!! 𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!"  𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!! 𝑣!𝑏!"  𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!" 𝑣!𝑏!!   ∗  𝑓!! 𝑓!" 𝑓!"  𝑓!" 𝑓!! 𝑓!"  𝑓!" 𝑓!" 𝑓!!  	
Which	in	turn	is	equal	to:		
𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑎𝑏 𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐+ 𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏+ 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑣𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑎 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑎+ 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑎 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑏 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑏 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑓𝑎𝑐 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑏𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑣𝑐𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑐𝑐 	
In	the	matrix	above,	each	column	represents	the	final	demand	of	each	country	across	
origins.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 rows	 indicate	 the	 origin	 of	 value	 added	 across	 uses,	 i.e.	
different	final	demand	and	the	intermediate	demand	it	goes	through.		
For	example,	the	first	element	in	the	top-left:	𝑣!𝑏!!𝑓!! + 𝑣!𝑏!"𝑓!" + 𝑣!𝑏!"𝑓!"	is	final	
demand	consumed	by	a	and	originated	entirely	by	country	a	divided	as	follows:	
1. 𝑣!𝑏!!𝑓!!	Value	added	produced	and	consumed	within	a,	i.e.	never	exported.		




From	 the	matrix	 above,	 the	 components	 that	 are	 included	 in	 our	 DVA	measure	 are	
those	in	bold	in	the	matrix	below:		







In	 this	Appendix	we	present	 some	more	detailed	 information	on	 the	data	we	use	 in	
Chapter	 4,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 most	 relevant	 robustness	 checks	 we	 have	 performed	 to	
establish	the	reliability	of	our	results.		
Appendix	3.1	–	Variables	and	data	









































































































































1	 	 	 	 	
dd_kbs	
_agr	
0.7412*	 1	 	 	 	
dd_kbs	
_min	
0.6035*	 0.7363*	 1	 	 	
schooling	 0.6159*	 0.5574*	 0.4882*	 1	 	
internetac

































































































Our	 main	 specification	 relies	 on	 per	 capita	 measures.	 This	 is	 to	 take	 into	 account	
different	size	of	countries	to	make	flows	of	value	added	across	countries	comparable.	
The	 underlying	 assumption	 is	 that	 countries	 with	 larger	 populations	 will	 also	 have	
larger	 production	 of	 KIBS	 and	 high-tech	manufacturing;	 they	 will	 also	 have	 a	 larger	
intermediate	demand	emanating	 from	the	NR	sector.	However,	 this	assumption	may	
not	 necessarily	 be	 true	 for	 the	NR	 sector	 in	 particular,	whose	 size	 can	 be	 driven	 by	
endowment	of	natural	resources	that	need	not	be	tightly	related	to	the	population	of	a	
country.	 The	 input-output	 tables	 allow	 for	 another	way	 of	 accounting	 for	 countries’	
size	 when	 looking	 at	 intermediate	 domestic	 demand.	 That	 is,	 using	 the	 coefficients	
from	 the	 Leontieff	 inverse	matrix	 for	 the	 two	NR	 sectors,	 AGR	 and	MIN.	 These	will	
capture	the	sector’s	intensity	in	KIBS	and	high-tech	manufacturing.		




















































Overall	 these	 additional	 results	 support	 our	 conjecture	 that	 intermediate	 domestic	
demand	emanating	from	the	NR	sectors	can	indeed	spur	the	export	of	KIBS,	and	that	
this	is	particularly	true	for	countries	with	a	specialisation	in	NRI.		
As	 for	 KIBS,	 we	 now	 look	 at	 our	 main	 model	 for	 high-tech	 manufacturing	 using	
Leontieff	Inverse	coefficients	in	Table	A9.	We	find,	globally	speaking,	consistent	results	
















































































































































































































































We	have	explored	 in	Chapter	 4	 the	 relationship	between	diversification	 (in	 terms	of	
number	 of	 traded	 products	 and	 trade	 partners)	 and	 the	 sophistication	 of	 export,	 in	
figure	4.3	and	4.4.		
Related	to	this,	we	wish	to	push	our	analysis	further	and	explicitly	 look	at	the	power	
relationships	 between	 buyers	 and	 suppliers	 and	 the	 association	 with	 sophistication,	
captured	by	our	complexity	measures.	In	Figures	4.5-4.8	we	show	how	each	of	the	four	
components	 of	 power	 is	 related	 to	 upper	 bound	 complexity	 (plotted	 against)	 and	
lower	bound	 complexity	 (coloured).	 Because	of	 the	high	number	of	 observations,	 to	














factors	 include	 the	 supplier’s	 own	 characteristics	 or	 other	 measures	 of	 power,	



















the	 former	 and	 complexity	 measures	 (both	 upper	 and	 lower	 bound);	 this	 may	 be	








In	 contrast,	 in	 Figure	 4.8	 we	 see	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 the	 second	
component	of	the	supplier’s	power	(its	market	share)	and	sophistication.	This	suggests	
that	 suppliers	 with	 significant	 market	 power	 also	 tend	 to	 trade	 in	 sophisticated	












We	 now	 provide	 some	 more	 detail	 on	 the	 how	 we	 estimate	 the	 productivity	 of	
suppliers.	One	of	 the	main	challenges	 in	estimating	productivity	at	 the	micro	 level	 is	
that	productivity	 is	unobserved	by	 the	 research	but	observed	by	 the	 firm,	and	 it	will	
affect	 the	 use	 that	 the	 firm	makes	 of	 its	 inputs,	 creating	 a	 “transmission	 bias”	 (del	




We	 follow	 Wooldridge	 (2009)	 and	 implement	 this	 in	 R	 with	 the	 prodest	 package,	
developed	 by	 Rovigatti.	 We	 estimate	 a	 Cobb-Douglas	 production	 function	 for	 each	
supplier	i	at	time	t:	





- ωit	 =	 g(xit,pit)	 is	 an	unknown	 function	g()	 of	 the	 state	 and	 a	 variable	proxying	
productivity.	 In	particular	we	assume	that	our	proxy	variable	 (inputs)	 react	 to	
TFP	 and	 that,	 conditional	 on	 the	 state	 variable	 (total	 asset	 in	 this	 case),	 the	
proxy	variable	is	increasing	in	ωit		
- E(ωit	|	ωit-1	)=f[ωit-1	]	Productivity	is	an	unknown	function	f()	of	its	own	lag.		
We	 choose	 in	 particular	 to	 follow	 Levinsohn	 and	 Petrin	 (2003)	 and	 use	 inputs	 as	 a	







3. we	 also	 run	 another	 linear	 probability	 model	 to	 study	 the	 probability	 of	
improving	the	supplier’s	(rather	than	the	pair)	sophistication;		
4. we	present	our	main	results	excluding	the	pairs	with	US-based	buyers.		
Adding	 income	as	a	 control	 variable	 leaves	our	 results	essentially	unchanged.	This	 is	
probably	because	of	 two	reasons:	on	 the	one	hand	the	market	share	of	 the	supplier	
already	 accounts	 for	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 size	 effects	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 size	






























































income	 0			(0)	 0			(0)	 0			(0)	 0			(0)	
N.	obs.	 42741	 42741	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.94	 0.94	 0.97	 0.98	
OLS	 regression	 results	 with	 time	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	 dummies,	 with	 suppliers’	 size	 as	
additional	control,	measured	as	suppliers’	total	income	(i.e.	sales).		



































































N.	obs.	 42739	 42739	 42739	
R2	 0.37	 0.37	 0.73	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies	
with	 suppliers’	 size	 as	 additional	 control,	 measured	 as	 suppliers’	
total	income	(i.e.	sales).		
Dependent	 variable	 in	 col.	 1	 is	 a	dummy	 taking	 value	1	 if	 the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	







































































































N.	obs.	 42724	 42724	 42758	 42758	




increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	






We	 now	 present	 the	 results	 for	 our	 linear	 probability	 models	 exploring	 the	
introduction	of	new	products	and	 the	 increase	of	 the	pair’s	 sophistication.	Our	main	
model	controls	for	past	levels	of	sophistication	of	the	pair;	in	these	tables	we	control	
instead	for	the	past	sophistication	levels	of	the	supplier.		
Table	 A4	 replicates	 Table	 4.7,	 looking	 at	 how	 the	 power	 indexes	 are	 related	 to	 the	
probability	 of	 introducing	 a	 new	 product	 into	 the	 pair	 and	 whether	 this	 product	 is	
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simply	new	to	the	pair	or	to	the	supplier	too.	We	find	overall	consistent	results,	except	
for	 the	 sign	 of	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 supplier’s	 upper	 bound	 sophistication,	
exp_pci,	with	the	probability	of	 introducing	a	product	new	to	the	supplier.	While	the	




that	 have	 not	 been	 traded	 by	 the	 supplier	 in	 the	 previous	 year.	 However,	 this	
relationship	works	for	suppliers	that	have	not	yet	reached	high	levels	of	sophistication:	
thus,	 being	 in	 very	 sophisticated	 relationships	 is	 particularly	 beneficial	 for	 suppliers	
that	are	not	very	sophisticated	themselves.		
Interestingly,	we	also	find	that	there	is	a	positive	association	between	the	dependence	























































nhs_d	 			 			 0.669	***	(0.0036)	
N.	obs.	 42758	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.36	 0.36	 0.73	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	 variable	 in	 col.	 1	 is	 a	 dummy	 taking	 value	 1	 if	 the	 pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	if	the	
pair	 introduces	a	new	product	 that	 the	supplier	wasn’t	exporting	 in	 the	
year	before.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
exp_pci	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity	 of	 the	 supplier,	





In	 Table	 A.15	 we	 replicate	 Table	 4.8,	 looking	 at	 the	 likelihood	 of	 increasing	 pair’s	
sophistication,	although	controlling	now	for	the	supplier’s	sophistication	 levels	as	we	
did	in	Table	A.14.		
Overall	 we	 again	 find	 consistent	 results,	 although	 there	 are	 some	 changes	 in	 the	
significance	levels	of	the	relationships	between	the	supplier’s	dependence.	This	is	now	
only	 significantly	 and	 negatively	 associated	 to	 increases	 in	 the	 upper	 bound	 and	
median	sophistication	of	the	pair.		
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We	 also	 detect	 some	 changes	 in	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 coefficients	 of	 the	 buyer’s	
dependence,	 which	 is	 insignificant	 for	 the	 probability	 of	 increases	 in	 the	 median	























































































N.	obs.	 42724	 42724	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.11	 0.15	 0.21	 0.15	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.		
Dependent	variables	in	columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	taking	value	one	if	the	pair	experiences	an	
increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 of	 the	 supplier,	 rather	 than	pair,	 on	
which	the	outcome	variable	is	based:	col.	1:	lagged	level	of	upper	bound	complexity	of	the	supplier;	





We	now	 run	 a	 similar	 linear	 probability	model	 to	 the	ones	 above,	 but	we	 study	 the	
probability	 of	 increasing	 the	 four	 measures	 of	 sophistication	 at	 the	 supplier	 level,	
rather	 than	 the	pair.	 The	main	difference	with	 the	models	present	 so	 far	 is	 that	 the	
205		
outcome	 variables	 have	 always	 been	 at	 the	 pair	 level,	while	 in	 this	 case	we	 look	 at	
suppliers.		
In	table	A.16	we	find	the	number	of	products	exported	by	the	pair	to	have	unchanged	
coefficients	with	respect	 to	previous	specifications.	The	 lagged	 level	of	 the	supplier’s	
sophistication	 is	 also	 consistently	 negatively	 associated,	 as	 has	been	detected	 in	 the	
previous	tables.		
We	find	that	the	dependence	of	the	supplier	is	negatively	correlated,	as	was	often	the	




The	 buyer’s	market	 share	 is	 positively	 associated	with	 increases	 in	 the	 lower	 bound	
and	median	sophistication,	which	suggests	that	pairs	with	a	large	buyer	are	more	likely	
to	see	the	supplier	drop	low-productivity	products,	although	the	same	cannot	be	said	
of	 the	 probability	 of	 introducing	 products	 that	 are	 more	 sophisticated	 than	 those	
already	exported	by	the	supplier.		





































































N.	obs.	 42758	 42739	 42758	 42758	
R2	 0.21	 0.14	 0.21	 0.18	
Linear	probability	model	with	year	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	
Dependent	variables	 in	 columns	1-4	are	dummy	variables	 taking	value	one	 if	 the	 supplier,	 rather	
than	 the	 pair,	 experiences	 an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	
from	the	previous	year,	respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 on	which	 the	 outcome	 variable	 is	




































































N.	obs.	 26099	 26099	 26108	 26108	
R2	 0.89	 0.89	 0.94	 0.96	
OLS	regression	results	with	time	and	buyer-supplier	pair	dummies.	Estimates	based	
on	pairs	with	non-US	based	buyers	only.		




















































































N.	obs.	 26099	 26099	 26099	
R2	 0.35	 0.35	 0.73	
Linear	 probability	 model	 with	 year	 and	 buyer-supplier	 pair	
dummies.	Estimates	based	on	pairs	with	non-US	based	buyers	only.			
Dependent	variable	 in	 col.	 1	 is	 a	dummy	 taking	value	1	 if	 the	pair	
introduces	a	new	product,	col.	2	and	3	use	a	dummy	taking	value	1	














































































N.	obs.	 26091	 26091	 26108	 26108	




an	 increase	 in	 upper-,	 lower	 bound,	 median	 and	 average	 complexity	 from	 the	 previous	 year,	
respectively.			
All	explanatory	variables	are	lagged,	except	TFP	and	age.	
Lagged_level	 is	 the	 lagged	 level	 of	 the	 sophistication	measure	 on	which	 the	 outcome	 variable	 is	
based:	 col.	 1:	 lagged	 level	 of	 upper	 bound	 complexity;	 col.	 2:	 lagged	 level	 of	 lower	 bound	
complexity;	col.	3:	lagged	level	of	median	complexity;	col.	4:	lagged	level	of	average	complexity.	
Signif.	Codes:	0	***;	0.001	**;	0.01	*;	0.05	°	
Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Source:	Author’s	own	calculation.	
	
